III.2, Hypostases and more

Question 2 in the Tertia Pars is all about the mode of union in the Incarnation.

Having read Maximus and things about Maximus lately, I've been careful to listen for any important distinctions between hypostasis and persons, but as far as Saint Thomas is concerned, person only specifies the nature of the hypostasis--he repeats this several times in this question. At one point, he distinguishes individual substance from hypostasis which are not commonly distinguished, but hypostasis adds the notion of completion. It seems that St Thomas is calling the humanity of Christ an individual substance, but not a hypostasis since it is in the Word that it exists. In 2.6, Thomas makes the interesting claim that the hypostasis is "midway" between the nature and the accidents, so that substantial union or accidental union are extremes of which the hypostatic union is a mean. This is interesting. Hypostasis is a mean at least in that it shares something with the accounts of nature and accident: both nature and hypostasis share the name "substance" and are not in something, whereas hypostasis is closer to accidents than nature in that hypostasis is the subject of accidents.

And so there is then the question of Christ's esse. When Thomas talks about whether the union of the Incarnation is created, he says that it is created because it begins to be. So there is created esse in the humanity of Christ. And yet it is the hypostasis that exists completely, and later on (17.2, though I didn't look closely) where Thomas will say that Christ has only one esse and not two. So then which will it be? The esse of the Word is uncreated and the same with the Father and the Spirit, no? Yet the humanity and union itself is created, so does not Christ have created esse? I suppose I will find out in due time... Another note, St Thomas talks about "personal esse" (Christ's union) and how this cannot be merited, unlike habitual grace (like we have in our soul) which can be merited in a certain way. One more note: In 2.7.ad3, to-be-created pertains more to esse than to relation; here esse refers to the union/nature whereas relation indicates the person. More familiar example: that I am created has to do with my esse and not my relation (neither to my parents nor even to God, since that relation is logically consequent to my esse).

In 2.9, there is a rare case in the Summa of Thomas replying to the Sed contra and disputing the authority of St Augustine! Augustine claims that humanity is more in the Son than the Son is in the Father. St Thomas says he is wrong, and yet says the humanity of Christ is united to the Son in a hypostasis (they are the same person) whereas the Father and the Son are not the same person, but wholly one according to nature and power. I'm inclined to agree with St Thomas, and yet there's something that makes me want to consider it further (and perhaps read Augustine in context). Earlier in the Summa, Thomas says the "Father" is said per prius of the person and per posterius of the Godhead. So would the unity of the person somehow be greater than that of the Godhead? (Remember, God is absolutely one; the only distinction within God is relative--real, but relative.)

At this point, I am looking forward to question 17 which contains only two articles: Is Christ one or two? And does he have only one esse? I also want to write something clear and consistent (and true) about the distinction between in re and in ratione. This distinction is very important in understanding God's tri-unity, and does not stop being important in considering the incarnation. It is surprising to read how created the Incarnation is, and yet how thoroughly divine. His treatment of Nestorius position is helpful as well, since he gleans a lot of the positive things in his teaching. He even calls one position in the Sentences worse than Nestorius. Oh my.

Maximus, Concrete Universals

Lately, I'm reading a book by von Balthasar on St Maximus the Confessor. It is sometimes very difficult, and my current difficulty is on the meaning of the "concrete universal".

For background, when I first encountered philosophy, it was through the mind of Plato. I was convinced that there were "separated substances" (I didn't yet know that phrase) also known as the Platonic forms, and that every being was what it was through participating in one of these many forms. They were a cause of both being and of knowing. In college, I read lots and lots of Aristotle. As time went on, I refined my use of the word "universal" to what is said of many and to the idea in my mind after I have abstracted it from the here and the now, from its particular conditions. So when I see concrete universal, I think, "A contradiction in terms?" But there's probably more to it than that...

If the universal (the whole) only exists in the mind or in speech, then is there no real unity among the human race? If there were an Idea that caused all men to be such, then they would be one through having a common cause. As it is, I do not think there is some immaterial form between us and God that we participate in to be what we are. We certainly all exist inasmuch as we participate in God's essence, but this is had in common with all creatures. This concern for the unity of humanity is also related to the question of our redemption. "What is not assumed is not redeemed," is the famous axiom of Irenaeus and many early fathers. Therefore, Christ must completely assume human nature--but how can this affect us unless there is some real unity between our nature and his that goes beyond speech and thought?

One thought I had is that relation exists through action/passion or quantity according to Aristotle. Therefore it seems that it is through the action/passion of begetting/begotten that the whole human race is united (or at least related, which would mean some kind of unity). Having Aristotle in mind, I thought of two possibilities:

• The human race has always existed.
• This is almost certainly not held by anyone.
• Yet Aristotle would have held this view, which makes me wonder if he could have thought that all men are related through generation. Perhaps infinite time would mean that inevitably everyone is related to everyone, and actually through infinitely many cycles of ancestors. So I suppose that would do it.
• The human race began to exist.
• This is less messy: all humanity traces back to a pair of parents.
• It can be a little messy since certain evolutionary takes will allow that different communities of men arose in different regions at different times. But do these accept that man is essentially different from other animals? I'm going to assume that. Many of these will reduce all biological operation to the chemical and that to the physical, so that "birth" is not even a category of the real. I'm not talking to those people...not right now.
• So then there are a single pair of parents from which all men sprung.

Now it is said that "in Adam all men sinned." This is bizarre, but because the "universal" was only said of him, whatever he did in the particular was true of all men. (I'm not going to talk about Eve right now...again, too messy. But I do think that will be important.) So when Adam sat, it was true that all men sat. When Adam sinned, all men sinned. So if anyone was ever a "concrete universal," it was probably Adam. And Christ too, who "recapitulated all humanity in himself" and was the second Adam or the last Adam. One problem is that Christ is not related to men through generation (unless somehow his actions affect us through him being a distant relative of our through Mary...not likely). Somehow this notion is involved with our salvation--that's why we are baptized, that is, born again.

Another difficulty with action/passion as basis of unity is that once that action is completed, is the relation only in the past? That seems wrong, since I am the son of my father, but it's not as though he is currently begetting me. Generation is complete. So it seems odd to me that we are related because of an action that is no longer happening.

Now I need to talk about matter. We talked about formal cause (which is only united in the mind, or if Platonic then they are also agents) and agent cause (whether Platonic forms or through generation), but matter is probably bound up with the problem and the solution of what a concrete universal is and if there is such a thing. It is interesting that the form which exists in the mind, gets there by abstracting from matter and material conditions; and yet the only reason there are many individuals under a universal in the first place is because of matter. Material things are necessarily separate on account of having diverse matter--no two material things can be in the same place at the same time. The mind is one place where two material things come together. Bob and George are two distinct beings and will never be in the same physical place, but I can think both of them at once (so they are both in my mind) or can think about their nature (and in this way they are one, in my mind). The matter keeps them apart outside of my mind. The matter does allow for them to be potentially one, like...if Bob ate George. George would cease to be George and Bob would be a little bigger. So probably not the unity we're looking for.

Going back to the concrete universal, Maximus talks about diastole and systole within a universal. The flux of individuals under a universal spreads out or compresses a universal. This is where things start to get confusing, but some simple sentences will (I think) manifest it a bit. If there are no men in America, then "No men in America is true." But through the actions of particular men, universal statements about man change. So if Bob and George discover America, it is now true to say, "Some men are in America." They have changed what is universally true of man!

All right, I think this is making sense. So is concrete universal opposed to abstract universal in that it takes into account all the particularities of individual men whereas the abstract does not take into account any? If that's all, then that's far more clear! There's still the interesting question I have about what really united all men, but at least I'll know what a concrete universal is.

This probably has implications for questions about male and female. It's odd that it belongs to man to be sexed, but that at least two individuals are required to express this diversity and even to reproduce, which is an essential action of man insofar as he is an animal. (Too difficult to think about.) Something to do with matter, why only material things reproduce, and more. This also makes a little sense of why Thomas might have said a female is a defective male--that is, to safeguard the unity of what man is. Most people would probably hope for a better solution to that problem...

Over break, I hope to finish the Maximus book, begin a book on Gregory of Nyssa and then read Thomas on how Christ assumed our nature. Von Balthasar also quotes Hegel more than I would expect (sometimes critically). I do not expect to pick up Hegel soon, but that may be somewhere down the line.

Oh, and final cause does not seem to be sufficient to unite us. All creatures aim at God in some way, but that seems to general to define man (just as with God as our exemplary cause or agent cause). Then again, through the grace of Christ, we do turn to God as our end in a more perfect way than the general natural tendency to good, and this is a cause of the unity of the Church, the body of Christ.

I'm kind of like Descartes sometimes...

(Just so you know, I'm just kind of typing stuff as it comes to mind...)

I've been thinking about Descartes lately and problems I have with him. But then I thought about it more and realized that a lot of his problems are my problems too. Among the many things Descartes learned was the philosophy of Suarez. He probably studied his Disputationes Metaphysicae, where Suarez summarizes all the opinions available on basically every metaphysical topic there is. Descartes sees all of these opposed positions and thinks "Oh no, how can we know who's right?" He responds by taking a radical move--he rejects them all and decides to figure it out by himself. Now it's one thing to try to confirm what one is taught by critiquing the argument or by reducing it to first principles, but to reject being handed on anything from another teacher is problematic.

On the other hand, having picked up Suarez the other day, I now see why he was so intimidated. Whereas in math, you can follow the steps of a proof back to principles or in natural science, where you can (hopefully) repeat experiments that you hear about. It is very easy (in some true sense) to be certain about mathematical and physical matters. Now when one starts talking about the principles of things, it can be much more difficult to attain certitude. A comment or critique that is often thrown at philosophy is "Aren't you just arguing about words?" Unfortunately, this is many times the case! One is merely looking for logical coherency in a set of ideas (Kant?), but a true philosophy looks at things and tries to understand them by their causes.

Descartes not only rejects the teaching of others but he even rejects the evidence of the senses. That's definitely when he goes too far (I'll explain why in a minute...). But my purpose isn't just to point out why Descartes is wrong, but it is to be sympathetic with him. This isn't just Descartes being all, "Teehee, I'm going to destroy perennial philosophy on a whim, and cast the world into doubt and mistrust!" His reaction to Suarez (there are others; I don't want to blame Suarez, but it's a lot easier to say one name) and an over-convoluted philosophy (and I really can't claim to know much about the truth/false of Suarez or how it was presented--excuse the over-generalizations) was mistrust. It's like when someone you trust lies to you and now you don't trust anyone. Or perhaps closer, it is like having two parents who teach you opposite things about the most important matters--it causes a confusion that is difficult to reconcile. The mass of contradictions makes one seek refuge in what is closest--myself.

So Descartes' new starting place, Cogito ergo sum, is now a very lonely one. "Look at me, I'm doing philosophy all by myself with no help from anyone!" Kant too makes it his project to place the a priori principles of all things in his mind so that it is possible to be certain about all without relying on another. He realizes the consequence of what he's doing though: you can't have knowledge about any thing. Eek. Descartes does this thing where he proves God's existence and that God would deceive him, and therefore he an trust his senses and everything is back to normal. Kant realizes that if you start with yourself alone you can only end with yourself alone--that's why Kant makes sure you're mind is pre-programmed with a lot of cool stuff to keep you occupied in the mean time.

But the reason for all this is a desire for certitude! And who doesn't want certitude? I like certitude... The problem is that reality isn't always so certain, so you need to trust. "Oh no, but what if I trust the wrong person?" Yeah, that is a good question. That's why lying is always evil... The fact is that you need to trust someone and you have done so regardless! An infant is wholly dependent, receiving food, comfort, and basic education from others. Within this basic education is language, the tool by which we will communicate with all of those whom we may possibly trust and learn from.

Oh yeah, and the world! Kant eventually gets very particular about what "sense experience" we can trust (it ends up just being the "forms" of sensation, space and time). So what of this world? What of the purpose of philosophy itself which initially sought to understand the meaning of this world, of life, of anything at all? Yeah, it's problematic. Kant keeps it fun by making everything a priori, and I think we can probably learn a lot from what he did, especially about structure of thought and (by coincidence) of things. But it ends up being all form and no content! But we must be contentious. Not really. I was just running out of time and that pun came to mind. I apologize. I'll probably write about this more later, since philosophy, its purpose, our purpose, and so on have all been on my mind lately!

An exhortation: The best philosophy of all is about the best things! So for example, thinking about God is the best because he is the best. Be excellent! Do excellent things! Give people something good to wonder about! It is too often that people begin philosophy in times of doubt or of terror. Let wonder and joy be the beginning!

Freedom is Relative

This may sound obvious, but it seems that whenever one speaks of freedom, it must be understood as freedom from something.

These thoughts are inspired in part by my Trinity professor and this letter by Charles DeKoninck:
http://www.scribd.com/doc/46162378/Letter-by-Charles-DeKoninck-to-Mortimer-Adler-1938

My professor, since the beginning of the year, has dropped hints here and there about the fundamental important of the notion of freedom. My first thought upon hearing this is to look into the Scriptures to see what freedom means there. In the Old Testament, it is freedom from slavery or from one's enemies. In the New Testament, it is freedom from sin and the things of this world. In both cases, it is a freedom from something for the sake of worshiping God. Every morning at prayer we say, "He has set us free from the hands of our enemies, free to worship him without fear, holy and righteous in his sight all the days of our life." And this seems to be the notion of freedom present throughout the Scriptures.

The question then comes of God's freedom. It is interesting that St Thomas does not set aside a quaestio for the consideration of God's freedom. This makes more sense though if we notice that the first 43 questions of the Summa consider God as he is in himself, i.e., from all eternity. Obviously we must begin with creatures in our understanding of goodness, perfection, life, love, and and so on. Yet from these many created realities, we come to understand more fully the one unchanging divine nature. So excluded from this section are any considerations of God as Lord, Creator, and as Free. God is certainly free, but what does this mean but free from the power of any creature? All creatures depend on him. The Psalm for evening prayer tonight is 139. This Psalm emphasizes the thoroughness of God's knowledge regarding his creatures:

O Lord, you search me and you know me,
you know my resting and my rising,
you discern my purpose from afar.
You mark when I walk or lie down,
all my ways lie open to you.

Before ever a word is on my tongue
you know it, O Lord, through and through.
Behind and before you besiege me,
your hand ever laid upon me.
Too wonderful for me, this knowledge,
too high, beyond my reach.

This knowledge referred to by the Psalm is that God knows even those things that depend on human freedom. Going on, the Psalmist talks more about how all of our actions are known by him, "written in his book."

Already you knew my soul,
my body held no secret from you
when I was being fashioned in secret
and molded in the depths of the earth.
Your eyes saw all my actions,
they were all of them written in your book,
every one of my days was decreed
before one of them came into being.

To me, how mysterious your thoughts,
the sum of them not to be numbered!
If I count them, they are more than the sand;
to finish, I must be eternal, like you.

So whatever kind of freedom man has, it seems that we never have a freedom from God, in the sense that we are apart from him in a way that allows to do what we otherwise could not. Truly all of our freedom is from God insofar as he makes us free, but only insofar as he makes us free from sin and from attachment to creatures. Now some will hear this and think that God is being violent or forceful, but this is comes from thinking of God as a creature or as something else opposed to our happiness. Other cases of the higher leading the lower make clear that the lower is elevated by this. The soul/will/mind moves the body--if it didn't, the body would lie in a heap. The parent moves/feeds/changes the child and this leads to the health and benefit of the child. God does more, far more, and for every creature, and the only ones that in some way can turn away from this are men and angels. Yet even they do not escape God altogether, for the Lord orders all things sweetly and he will dispose even sin unto his glory. Jesus Christ manifests his glory most brilliantly in freeing us from sin.

I will have to go back to St Thomas and consider carefully what he says regarding freedom in the places where he talks about, especially when he talks about the freedom of God. One question that I always have is how it is that God freely creates? I had a brief post asking that earlier. It is at least certain to me that creation does not itself cause him to create it, i.e., nothing outside of him forces him to create. For then what is this thing that has a power over God? So no. But can it be said that God necessarily creates, though not necessitated from without? I don't like how it sounds, but I haven't yet seen the problem with it. Surely St Thomas considers this in various places as well. I'll post some findings later if I have time.

The DeKoninck letter has more interesting considerations of person, nature, incommunicability, and so on. That in God the Word proceeding is identical with the Son begotten is interesting. In the Old Testament, it was through begetting offspring that the promise was passed on; in the New Testament, it is through the preaching the word that men inherit the promise. This is all contained in God's interior life. Nature communicates itself. Knowledge is to have the other as other. So many things to consider.

Unity in Diversity

Lately I've been thinking about what it means to be one and how it is possible for many to be one. This is just going to be a handful of thoughts...

Here's one article that made me think about it:
https://docs.google.com/file/d/0B1LariKu6m5TS09Nc21xMDlhVGs/edit?usp=sharing

Even before reading that, I had lately been thinking about how diversity is the condition for the greatest forms of unity. An illustration: what is more one, a cup of water or a man? Now certainly the water is more uniform in its constitution, whereas man is made up of so many diverse parts which are sometimes more less essential. Yet the man has a unity which the water does not. You can take a cup of water and divide it in two without having changed it very much--you could put the parts back together and it would be as if nothing happened. Man on the other hand has such a unity that if you cut something off, it will probably not attach as easily and (depending on what you cut off) it might make that man cease to be a man altogether.

It's interesting that the greatest mysteries of the Faith also involve unity, not unity without distinction, but a higher sort of unity. I believe in one God. A fairly simple statement. Yet of God I will say The Father is God, the Son is God, the Holy Spirit is God and also The Father is not the Son, the Son is not the Father, and the Holy Spirit is not the Father or the Son. One in essence, one in everything, except that by which they are opposed: relative opposition. This relative opposition is all that distinguishes the persons who are one God.

Then the other great mystery of the Faith: the Incarnation. Jesus Christ is true God and true man, yet he is not two persons on account of this. Jesus Christ is one person who is eternally God and assumed human nature to himself, not such that he was joined to a person distinct from himself, but so that he the divine Word was indeed man without ceasing to be God.

Those are the most extreme cases, where the unity and the distinction are greater than found anywhere else.

Another example where distinction is necessary for unity: producing offspring. Perhaps the most interesting aspect of evolutionary biology is the how the diversity of sexes came to be. If asexual organisms are capable of reproducing without aid from another, why would they change so that diversity of sex would be necessary for reproduction? Similar questions have come to my mind: Is it better to be a plant than to be an animal since you're able to make your own food without moving? Or even as above, is it better to be water since you don't need to eat at all? The answer is probably no. Although being a man is far more difficult than being any other kind of material creature, it is certainly worth the effort.

Yes, a live-action picture of mitosis

So also for sexual diversity. At first, it seems like a step backwards. Now two creatures different in kind must interact in order to propogate the species. But upon reflection (and I would like to read more in this area), there are tons of benefits. First, it allows for diversity in a genetic pool so that if there is some sort of disease, it is more likely that some part of the species will outlive it. Second, with two sexes, there is a kind of specialization that occurs, a sort of "division of labor". The male animal (creature?) produces many, many small sex cells. This ability to produce many and more often allows him to be more mobile, more active. The female animal produces one large, sex cell (or perhaps a sacful) which is rich in nutrients and will be the place where the next organism develops.

[I'm skimming Wikipedia as I write this. Found a great quote: "A third theory is that sex evolved as a form of cannibalism. One primitive organism ate another one, but rather than completely digesting it, some of the 'eaten' organism's DNA was incorporated into the 'eater' organism." That's pretty gnarly...]

Having looked at sexuality on merely a biological level, there is also the social level. Skipping person to person friendships (not because they're unimportant), some of the greatest things simply speaking involve the diversity of many members. Three examples: the universe, the state, and the Church. St Thomas argues that the greatest good in the universe is the very order of the universe itself (God is the greatest good outside the universe). Because this includes every creature, but in such a way that each one is fittingly related to every other creature, this will certainly outdo any other order of diverse things to be found in the universe.

The state is another important example. This is hard to see for many, since our government is pretty lame sometimes, etc. But a state is more than its government! It's you and me, and the people who own the grocery store, and the people who work at McDonald's, and the people who start and educate and study and schools. A state is constituted by many persons who all share a common life in some way or another. Whatever problems there are, this order is present and always at work even if you do not notice. I'm not in constant fear of my life. Not because I could take on anyone who came at me with a knife, but because I'm surrounding by people who are formed in virtue (to the extent that they wouldn't do that) and those who would like to do it are dissuaded by the laws and the customs that bring upon them all sorts of unpleasant consequences. Also, if I didn't live in a state, I would have to kill/grow/scavange for everything I ate. Ain't nobody got no time for that. And learning too: I would have to discover everything on my own.

And then there is the Church. This is what is described in 1 Corinthians 12, especially with the image of the Church as the Body of Christ. We started by contrasting the human body with the uniformity of water. This ordered diversity, as it is assumed in Christ, then becomes the image of the unity of the entire community of those in the Church. In a later post, I will go back to considering the kingdom of heaven (especially as in Matthew) and how the descriptions of Christ always involve, not only the God, but also the bad who have a role in the story of the kingdom of heaven. This resolving of the good and evil (which is always involved in the kingdom of heaven) is still distinct from the unity of the members in the body of Christ (who are apostles, prophets, teachers, etc.) and also the unity of the head with the body, of Christ with Church, of a husband and his spouse.

And there's always more... Like friendship. And how this all relates to the mind. And music. And art. And Hegel, "Matter is to gravity as spirit is to freedom." But more later.

Hierarchy of truths, God and creatures

Right now I'm reading Theology Today: Perspectives, Principles, and Criteria for a fundamental theology class. (read it here: http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/cti_documents/rc_cti_doc_20111129_teologia-oggi_en.html ) That will involve writing a paper, so I will probably write more thoughts on it. There was a citation in the section on faith's relationship with reason, and I was glad to see that it adapts very much of what St. Thomas teaches on philosophy. What especially stood out is the way our mind stands to reality, not as something that imposes order on it, but rather as something that is open to reality and approaches it by different methods. I'll think more about that later...

Later on the document talked about an order among truths, citing St. Thomas. In haste, I will just cite II-II, q. 1, a. 7. Go read Thomas. The point that stood out is that all the articles of faith are contained in two: "God exists" and "God is provident". These two truths sum up or contain everything about God's interior life and exterior life. They contain the mystery of the most holy Trinity and the mystery of the Incarnation. What is interesting is that both of these truths fall under those that can be attained by human reason. So at some point I will want to work out the details of how they can be at once truths knowable by unaided reason and yet contain all the other articles of faith virtually, in such a way that God a man who held just those to propositions by faith (rather than reason?) might even be justified on account of that faith. Is it faith that makes the holding of those proposition salutary? Is that because faith is necessarily open to further instruction from another, whereas reason may see itself at a conclusion? Not sure, more thinking will follow.

Also related to this, is the mystery of creation and everything that isn't God. It is interesting that St. Thomas names two propositions rather than one. Earlier in the Summa, it is shown that God is provident, and it seems (I'm pretty sure it is) the case that God's providence is the same with his essence. Yet, why would he single this attribute out? It seems that it is because it has to do with what is not necessary. It is necessary that God exist. It is not necessary that he create, and consequently be provident over such a creation. This reminds me of an argument I had a year ago about whether God's providence is really knowable by human reason. I held that it was...and I still think it is, but I also have a hunch that it's account makes it different from other predicates that pertain to God. The fact that reason must start with creatures in ascending to knowledge of God, means that natural knowledge of God will some how involve his relation to creatures.

Just to draw out what I mean by the mystery of creation (this is all out of order, but apparently so is my mind): God is free in creating the world. He doesn't have to. And yet God does do it. And God's being and activity are not other than each other in re, at least with respect to his interior life (I wish I could state more definitively about all his activity, but this is where my understanding breaks down). If God is the same with his activity, does that mean he is the same with his act of creation? But if his essence is to create the finite world, then isn't it necessary that he do so? If it is necessary, is it contrary to his freedom? If it is not necessary, then is that act really the same with his essence?

Boethius and the 10 Commandments

Boethius and the 10 Commandments

Today I was reading 1 Corinthians, thinking about how things in this world distract from God, and then I thought of Boethius! It seems that the 5 false happinesses he names in Book 3 of the Consolation correspond to the middle commandments.

Honor - Honor your father and mother
Power - Thou shall not kill
Pleasure - Thou shall not commit adultery
Riches - Thou shall not steal
Fame - Thou shall not bear false witness

While thinking, honor was the one I forgot, collapsing it with fame. Honor is what pertains to a politician or military hero, whereas fame would pertain more to a celebrity.

The first 3 commandments require that God be our end, and that we reverence him in speech and with our time. The next 5 commandments keep us from 5 idols, false beatitudes. Honor, by requiring that we honor another; power, by forbidding us from taking the life of others; pleasure, by limiting and ordering the most intense animal pleasure; riches, by commanding we respect the goods of other; and fame, by forbidding that we lie (for we often do this for the sake our reputation, so we can control how others esteem us).

The last 2 commandments are about coveting, which teaches us that the heart is essential. It does not matter what you do or don't do, unless the Lord be present to your heart. The heart, a mystery.

(I'm reading Proverbs: I will share later what it says about the heart.)


Sent from my iPhone

Reading Euthyphro

"I prefer nothing, unless it is true."

I hadn't read Plato for the last couple months but I found out that my cousin is reading Euthyphro for a summer program, so I decided to reread it.
It starts with Socrates and Euthyphro waiting outside a court room. Euthyphro is going to prosecute his father who killed a murderer of one of his own slaves. Euthyphro says it is pious to do what he does, against the opinions of his relatives.
What is piety? This is the question that starts and ends the dialogue, but the consideration allows a number of topics to be considered.
1. What is favored by the gods. This response is problematic from the beginning since the gods seems to disagree about what is right and wrong, always disputing with each other. If such were truly the definition of piety, there could be only one God or at least all the gods would have to be of one mind. Which leads to the second account:
2. What is favored by all of the gods. At this point, the speakers agree that it is an axiom that "the wicked is to be punished" but find that many disagree about who is wicked. There is a comparison with sciences here. If two disagree about how many something is, the argument can be solved by counting. But if there is an argument about good and bad, beautiful and ugly, then it becomes difficult to resolve the questions. Math is easy. The question is also asked. Is something pious because gods love it, or do they love it because it is pious? This question is never wholly resolved.
3. Piety is the species of justice concerned with care for the gods. At first Euthyphro identifies justice and piety, but Socrates shows him how they must differ in account. The remainder is concerned with what care of the gods means. They come to sacrificing and praying, which Socrates says is like "trading" with them. The problem is that we are needy and they are not. So Socrates suggests other ways our care could be good for the gods, but Euthyphro becomes frustrated and he then must hurry on.

This is a wonderful place to start philosophy! The attempt to define is important in philosophy and that is precisely the project here. He shows that many examples are not the same as a definition, distinguish the caused and the cause, distinguish genus and species, test your definition. Another reason this dialogue is great is that it quickly rises from moral philosophy, which is necessary for one who desires wisdom, to theology, which is wisdom itself. Unfortunately, he does not reach a satisfactory conclusion, but the reader is more prepared for a future inquiry.
A good question: Does it belong to philosophy to consider prayer and sacrifice? Such questions are often dealt with in the context of sacred theology, and yet the topics are so universal and natural that they may belong even in natural accounts of God and the moral life. That is why thy show up here. I was always disappointed that Aristotle did not say much about worshipping God or the gods. For Moses, this is the first of all commandments. Plato and Aristotle certainly hold the divine in esteem, but the former is not explicit about what exactly is due to God and Aristotle seems to say nothing. Prayer seems close to what Aristotle means by contemplation, though Aristotle's account does not have the petition aspect. Sacrifice is even more obscure.


Sent from my iPhone

Per se nota (I, 2, 1)

http://www.corpusthomisticum.org/sth1002.html

This article in St. Thomas is great as a brief consideration of what is self-evident and what is not. Here is just a list of all the claims made about what is per se notum:

• Knowledge of the per se nota is in us naturally
• Per se nota are known as soon as the terms in the propositions are known
• e.g. When it is known what a whole is and what a part is, it is known that the whole is greater than the part
• The principles of demonstration are per se nota
• The existence of truth is per se notum
• Whoever denies truth to be concedes its existence
• For if truth is not, then it is true that it is not
•  No one is able to think the opposite of what is per se notum

 All of those propositions are from the objections and the contrary. They serve to get one thinking about per se nota, to consider what they are and examples of them. Then the body gives the important distinction:

•  Something is said to be per se notum in two ways
• According to itself, but not with respect to us
• According to itself, but with respect to us
• Some proposition is per se nota when its predicate is included in the account of the subject
• e.g. Man is an animal; this is self-evident because the predicate is in the account of the subject
• If the what of the subject and predicate is know to all, then the proposition will be known to all
• e.g. common terms which no one is ignorant of as being and non-being, whole and part, and like things (including like and unlike!)
• If the what of the subject or the predicate is not known, then the proposition is in itself per se nota, but not to those ignorant of the terms

So this is all that he states about per se nota generally. He then applies what he's said to God. Even the replies to the objections have only to do with the application to God. Yet what he says about God still makes even clearer certain things about the per se nota. "God is" is a per se notum in itself since God is the same with his existence, yet not with respect to us since we don't know the essence of God. He then says that we need to prove it through what is more known to us. This shows that it is not intrinsically impossible to prove what is in itself per se notum, but then it raises a question: Is every true scientific proposition per se notum in itself? For example, if someone really knew the what of a triangle and the what of having angles equal to two rights, would they known that every triangle has its angles equal to two rights? What is important for this article is showing that God's existence is not self-evident in such a way that we know it without proof. The same is true about the triangle proposition, regardless of whether or not the predicate is somehow contained in the subject.

The first reply concedes that it is self-evident that God exists in a common way, insofar as our beatitude is known. Here is a the brief argument:

• Man naturally desires beatitude
• What is naturally desired by man is naturally known by him.
• For one cannot desire what one does not know
• Therefore, man naturally knows beatitude

A difficulty occurs to me. That last statement looks like a conclusion to me, but St. Thomas seems to think that it is per se notum, and insofar as it is per se notum, God is per se notum in a confused way (since he happens to be our beatitude). But if what makes something per se notum is having the statement known as soon as the subject and predicate are known, then we need only look at the terms. Beatitude is by definition what all men desire, therefore all men desire beatitude. Desire by definition follows upon apprehension or knowledge. Something can only be desired to the extent it is known, but if it is desired naturally then it must needs be known naturally. Therefore, man naturally knows beatitude. As long as one keeps the notion of beatitude very vague there, it is clearly self-evident.

The last reply helps reaffirm that knowledge of axioms are in a way about everything, but in a confused and indistinct way that asks for more. It is per se notum that the some common truth exists, but not that the first truth exists.

Axiom in the Catechism

I was reviewing the Baltimore Catechism this evening and found a passage that would serve as a decent philosophy lesson:

"Q. 516. Why can there be only one true religion?
A. There can be only one true religion, because a thing cannot be false and true at the same time, and, therefore, all religions that contradict the teaching of the true Church must teach falsehood. If all religions in which men seek to serve God are equally good and true, why did Christ disturb the Jewish religion and the Apostles condemn heretics?"

This beautiful argument that there is only one true religion is just a consequence of the first of all axioms: a thing cannot be and not be at the same time. Even if one has disputes about where to find true religion, let there be no dispute that contradiction excludes the possibility of all religions being true.

One more point to notice. My last philosophy professor once said that if you are giving a speech to a crowd and need to convince them, do NOT use a demonstrative syllogism, rather use examples or signs. They are far weaker arguments, and yet more people are convinced by them. Thus the author gives the examples of Christ and the Apostles in their encounters with the Jews and heretics. Once I'm firmer in philosophy and logic, I will have to return to rhetoric (despite my skepticism), since possessing the truth is a prerequisite for sharing it but not all sufficient.

May God bless us.


Sent from my iPhone

Self-evident principles?

Self-evident principles?
(Gleaned from ST I, q. 1)

Anything beyond what is sufficient is superfluous.
Nothing is known except the true.
Truth converts with being.
Men need to know their end so as to order their actions and intentions to it.
Man is ordered to God as to an end. (Self-evident to the wise?)
Diversity in the account of a knowable leads to a diversity of sciences.
Every science proceeds from principles either per se known or known by a higher science.
This divides the genus of sciences.
Science is not of singulars.
One is the science which is of one kind of subject.
The unity of powers and habits is from the unity of their object, with regard to the formal part.
The end of practical science is operation.
Every practical science is about things doable by men.
God, by the same science knows himself and those which he makes. (In general, is it the case that truths about God are per se known to the wise? I have in mind Boethius' example of the self-evident nature of incorporeal bodies not being in a place. I'm not sure if such truths belong in a list like this.)
Certitude pertains to the dignity of science.
One speculative science is more worthy than another on account of certitude and the dignity of the subject.
The natural light of human reason is able to err. (Many of the statements listed here are axioms, but this one seems a postulate, only known by experience. Unless one attends to the potency in the intellect itself: that may be sufficient.)
One practical science is more worthy than another if it is ordered to a higher end.
The ends of all the practical sciences are ordered to the end of the highest practical science.
The least knowledge about the highest things is more desirable than the most certain knowledge about the lowest things. (This may require an argument, or at least an awareness of how much better higher things are than lower.)
It belongs to the wise to order and to judge.
In any science, one must posit the what it is of the subject.
All things determined in a science are comprehended under its subject.
The subject stands to the science as the object stands to the power or habit.
All our knowledge has its beginning from sense.
Representation is naturally delightful to men.


Besides several of the statements at the beginning, most of these have to with knowledge in some way. Does this necessarily remove it from the realm of postulates? Since everything insofar as it is is knowable, perhaps it is possible that there be axioms there. Certainly some of these have the predicate contained in the subject. Other do seem mere postulates (the last might even be capable of proof, if one attends to the purpose of representation). Now to share some of these with others to see how self-evident they are!

(Almost unrelated: I went bowling today and some of us were very bad. Sometimes when one would hit a few pins, it would be said "Something is better than nothing." That sounds like an axiom.)


Sent from my iPhone

Outline of De ente, Chapters 5 and 6

Chapter 5: Further conclusions

About God

• [1] Some philosophers say God does not have any essence
• This is because his essence is not other than his existence
• [1] God is not in a genus
• Things in a genus have a common nature, but a diverse existence
• Since God's nature and existence are the same, he cannot have a common nature and a diverse existence
• Therefore, God is not in a genus
• [2] God is existence only, but this does not mean he is the existence of any given thing
• The existence of God is such that no addition can be made to it
• The common existence, although it does not include any addition in its account, it also does not exclude it
• Therefore, the existence of God is not the common existence
• [3] God has all perfections

About creatures

• [4] Intellectuals substances are finite and infinite in different ways
• They are finite insofar as their existence is received and therefore limited by the capacity of their nature, "finite from above"
• They are infinite insofar as they are not limited or cut off by being received into matter, "infinite from below"
• [4] Individuation never ceases in the human soul
• Individuation of the human soul depends on the body for its origin
• Once the human soul begins to exist at all (that is, once it has "absolute existence"), it acquires its own individuated existence
• This existence always remains individuated
• [5] Genus, species, and difference are found in separated substances on account of their essence being other than their existence; yet the proper accidents belonging to them are unknown to us
• [6-7] How the genus/species in separated substances differ from in composed substances
• In composed substances
• Genus is taken from what is material in the essence
• Difference is taken from what is formal in the essence
• In separated substances
• Difference cannot be taken from part of the essence, but must be taken from the whole essence
• Genus is also taken from the whole essence, but in a different way
• Genus is taken from what is common among separated substances, namely, from their immateriality and what follows up it, such as intellectuality
• Difference is taken from what is diverse in them, namely, from the various grades of perfection; not just any perfections, but ones belonging to the species themselves (just as animals have a higher grade of perfection than plants)
• [8] Essence as found in composed things

Chapter 6: How essence exists in accidents

• [1] How accidents exist, and how this differs from substance
• Accidents do not have existence through themselves but only through a subject; this is unlike substances which do not exist in a subject
• [1] Essence in accidental and substantial forms are alike
• This is because they both have incomplete definitions
• Their definitions are incomplete inasmuch as the definition of an accidental form requires the subject in which the accident exists, and the definition of a substantial form requires the matter in which it exists (just as the body is in the definition of the soul)
• [2] Essence in accidental and substantial forms are unlike
• The substantial form of itself does not have existence apart from that to which it comes (some matter), yet when it is conjoined to matter, an essence begins to be since the substantial form is part of a complete essence
• The accidental form comes to a being which is already complete in itself; therefore, the accident does not cause the existence of the subsisting thing to which it comes, but gives it a "second existence" and only causes something which is accidentally one; nor is an accident part of a complete essence
• [3] All accidents are caused by substances
• That which is most of all and most truly in any genus is the cause of those that are it in that genus (e.g. fire is the cause of heat in other things)
• Substance, most of all and most truly having essence, are first in the genus of being, and therefore are the cause of accidents which have being in a secondary way

[The rest of chapter 6 is omitted, since it will probably not be on the final.]

De ente Outline, Chapter 4

Chapter 4: How essence exists in separated substances

• [1] Intelligences are not composed of matter and form
• This is repugnant: They are called "separated" substances, that is, separated from matter
• A demonstration that they are immaterial
• Forms are not intelligible in act except when separated from matter and its conditions
• Nor are they intelligible except through the power of an understanding substance
• Therefore, an understanding substance must be free from matter and its conditions
• [2] One cannot even say there is a special kind of matter that belongs to intelligences
• If unintelligibility belonged to matter insofar as it was bodily matter, then it would belong to bodily matter in virtue of some bodily form
• But form is the principle of intelligibility in things, and even the bodily form is intelligible when separated from matter
• Therefore, unintelligibility belongs to matter itself
• And therefore, intelligences do not have any matter
• [3] It is possible for forms to exist without matter
• Whatever things are such that one is the cause of existence in the other, that one is able to exist without the other (this is not convertible)
• Form and matter are such that form gives existence to the matter; therefore, matter cannot exist without form but form can exist without matter
• [4] Differences between the essences of composed and simple substances
• Main difference:
• Essence of composed substance contains both form and matter
• Essence of simple substance is only the form
• First consequent difference:
• Essence of composed substance can be signified as whole (man) or part (humanity); and only as it is signified as whole can it be predicated of individual (Pete is a man, but Pete is not humanity)
• Essence of simple substance can only be signified as whole, for there is no other part to which the essence would stand (as form stands to matter in the composed)
• Second consequent difference:
• Essences of composed things are multiplied according to the division of designated matter; there can be many individuals in one species
• Essences of simple substances cannot be received into matter and therefore cannot be multiplied; there is only one individual of each species
• [5] Existence (esse) is not part of every essence
• No essence can be understood without those things that are parts of its essence
• However, every essence can be understood without understanding anything of its existence (e.g. one can consider man without considering his existence)
• Therefore, existence is something other than essence
  (except for the following...)
• [5] There is at most one being which has its existence the same with its essence
• Multiplication comes about in the following ways
• Addition of a difference (as nature of genus is multiplied into species)
• Form is received into diverse matters (as nature of species multiplied into individuals)
• Cannot be through the addition of a difference
• If something were existence alone, then to add a difference would mean that it is no longer existence alone
• Cannot be through the addition of matter
• Then it would not be subsistent existence, but a material thing
• Therefore, allowing that something is the same with its existence, there can only be one of these
• [6] There is at least one being has its existence the same with its existence; a proof for God’s existence
• Everything whose existence is other than its nature would have existence from another
• Everything which has something through another is led back to one (as to a first cause) which has that something through itself
• Therefore, there is something which is the cause of existence for all things that is existence itself
• Otherwise, one would go on infinitely
• (Note: Even though God is the same with his existence, this does not mean that his existence is self-evident to us. Since God’s essence is hidden to us, we can only learn through argument that God exists and that he is the same with his existence.)
• [7] There is potency in separated substances (even without matter/form)
• Everything that receives something is in potency with respect to that
• That which has been received is the act of the one receiving
• Therefore, the essence which is an intelligence is in potency to the existence which it received from God, and the received existence is its act
• [8] There is a multitude of separated substances
• It would be impossible for a multitude unless there were potency
• The multitude is possible because there is a distinction between them according to grade of act and potency
• The higher intelligence, closer to the first, has more of act and less of potency
• One way of conceiving this is that by one concept, many things are understood; and the higher the intellect, the more can be understood through a single concept
• The extremes of this are man, who must join his concepts and use arguments to go from considering one thing to another, and God, who understands all things through one concept
• [9] On the act and potency in the human soul and material things

De ente Outline, Chapter 3

Chapter 3: How the logical intentions (genus, species, difference) belong to essence

• [1] How universal notions (genus, species) are in an essence
• It is impossible that a universal notion belong to the essence as signified through mode of part (“humanity”)
• It is impossible that universal notion belong to essence existing outside the singulars (as the Platonists say)
• For then species/genus would not be said of the individual (e.g. one cannot say Socrates is that which is separated from him)
• Therefore, universal notions belong to the essence as signified through the mode of a whole (such as “man”) since it implicitly contains the individuals
• [2-3] Essence as signified through mode of whole can be considered in two ways
• According to its proper notion (absolute consideration)
• Nothing is true of this except what belongs to it insofar as it is this sort of thing; all else is a false attribution
• e.g. rational belongs to man absolutely considered, white or black do not, one or many do not
• According to the existence it has in this or that one
• This allows accidental predication of it on account of that in which it is
• e.g. man is white (since Socrates is white), though white does not belong to man as man
• Essence in this way has a twofold existence
• Either in singulars or in the soul
• Nature of man absolutely considered does not include existence at all, but it also does not exclude it
• This nature absolutely considered is predicated of individuals
• [4] How the universal notion belongs to the essence (more precisely than in [1])
• Universal notion does not belong to essence absolutely considered
• For then, wherever humanity was found, commonness would be found; but commonness does not exist in individuals
• Universal notion does not belong to essence according to the existence it has in individuals
• For human nature is not found in individuals in its unity
• Therefore, universal notion belongs to essence according to the existence it has in the understanding
• [5] How the intellect abstracts from what is universal
• [6] Although “Socrates is a man” and “Man is a species”, it is not true that “Socrates is a species”
• For species does not belong to man according to the existence it has in Socrates or absolutely considered
• Species belongs to man only as an accident consequent upon its existence in the intellect, but not to man as man
• [7] How predicability is in the notion of a genus
• [8] Summary

Sign and Symbol

I started reading a book by Charles Williams called Descent Into Hell. In the first chapter there is an argument going on about how to portray the Chorus in an experimental play that is being put on. At some point there is dispute about whether the play is 'symbolical' or 'significant'. The modernist lady is pushing for the symbolic character of all art, whereas the sensible says it must be significant. A remark is made at some point about how anyone could possibly still think such a thing.

This is not the first time I have encountered this distinction. It has turned up every single year in my education. The first place I can remember is in Aristotle's De Interpretatione, where we discussed nouns and verbs. Again while reading Martin of Denmark on the modes of signifying. The place when we discussed it most was in reading Viete and Descartes in junior math. In algebra, one works with symbols. These marks do not of themselves 'mean' anything, but they are assigned and can be manipulated without attention to the things they symbolize. This is different from signs which require that you attend to the thing signified if a sign is really working as it ought. I did not think much of the distinction at the time, but I'm starting to see more in it.

Currently we are reading St. Thomas on the sacraments (which are signs of sacred realities) and I remember that St. Augustine started his treatise on Christian doctrine by distinguishing things and signs. A sign (hehe) that this distinction has become more important is that I am repulsed when I hear people call them symbols. The difference (as far as I can tell) is that the sign points to something beyond itself. Words necessarily mean something, point to something if they are really words.

Something worth attending to: there are natural signs but not natural symbols. This should highlight the exclusively artificial character of symbols. Natural signs are everywhere; as many as there are effects of causes. Smoke is a sign of fire, dark clouds signify a coming storm, a woman's unusually large middle signifies a child growing within her. In Aristotle's logic, we learn about the argument through sign (enthymeme), and though it seemed so weak compared to the syllogism, we rely on it for our knowledge of so many things. We need to trust that the appearance of nature is significant. Something in the modern philosophers reject that. Descartes doesn't want to learn from others, Hume denies cause and effect, and Kant doesn't allow that certitude can come from without.

This is not to say that symbols are bad. The creeds which the Church profess are often called symbols. Yet one must not jumble them with signs, for they are different in their what and their purpose. Since much of our learning will come by hearing or reading words, and words are signs, we must inquire into signs in order to root our intellectual life. The roots of the tree which has every discipline as its branch is logic.


Sent from my iPhone

Outline of De ente, Chapters 1 and 2

Prologue

• “Small error in the beginning is a great one in the end.”
• Outline
• What is signified by “being/ens” and “essence”
• How essence is found in diverse things
• What it relates to the logical intentions (genus, species, difference)
• Understanding should go from composed things to simple things
• Therefore, we will consider ens and then essential

Chapter 1: What ens and essentia mean

• [1] Ens per se is said in two ways
• What is divided through the 10 genera
• What signifies the truth of propsitions
• The second way is said of anything (even “nothing” and “blindness”); the first way is only of what posits something in the thing
• [2] “Essence” is from “ens” in the first way, and is that through which something is in its genus and species
• [3] Other names for essence:
• “Whatness/Quidditas,” since the genus and species tell what a thing is
• “What it was to be,” that is, that through which something has it to be a what
• “Form,” through form is signified the exactness of anything
• “Nature,” taken to mean everything that can in any way be seized upon by the understanding, or it means the essence of thing as it is ordered to its proper operation
• “Essence,” since through it and in it a being/ens has existence/esse
• [4] Since ens is first said of substances, so essence is most properly in substances
• Furthermore, essence is in composed and simple substances
• But in the simple in a more noble way since they cause the composed ones
• The simple essences are more hidden, so we begin with the composed

Chapter 2: How essence exists in composed substances

• [1-2] What the essence of a composed thing is not
• Not the matter alone
• A thing is knowable and in its genus/species through essence
• Matter is not a principle of cognition, nor does it place in genus/species
• Not the form alone
• Essence is signified by the definition of a thing, but natural things have matter in their definition (otherwise their definition would be like math definitions which do not have matter in them)
• Therefore the essence comprehends matter and form
• Not the relation between matter and form (or any other accident)
• This would be an accident and extraneous, and would not make the thing known
• Nor do accidents make a thing be simply, but only in a way (secundum quid); e.g. whiteness only makes a thing to be white, whereas the form makes a thing to be simply
• [3] This account agrees with many philosophers and with reason

Important distinction: Designated and undesignated

• [4] Difficulty: Since matter is the principle of individuation, it may seem that an essence that contains matter is only the essence of a particular; universals could not be defined
• Solution:
• Principle of individuation is not matter taken in any way
• Principle of individuation is signate or designated matter, matter considered under determinate dimensions
• This designated matter is not in the definition of man as man, but would be in the definition of Socrates
• Undesignated matter is in the definition of man (not this bone or this flesh, but bone and flesh absolutely)
• Therefore, the essence of man and Socrates do not differ except by according to the matter being designated (signate) or undesignated (non-signate)
• [5] The essence of genus and species also differ according to designation, but not in the same way
• Designation of an individual with respect to species is through matter under determinate dimensions
• Designation of a species with respect to genus is through a difference taken from the form of the thing
• Also, it is through something that is somehow in the genus
• Whatever is in the species is in the genus in an indeterminate way
• If this were not so, one could not predicate the genus of a species (e.g. one could not say man is an animal)
• [6-7] Body is said in many ways
• “Body” as it is in genus of substance (this is the sense taken below)
• Said about that which has such a nature that the 3 dimensions can be designated in it
• “Body” as it is in genus of quantity
• Said about those 3 dimensions which can be designated in a body
• “Body” can signify with precision
• In this way, to add anything would put that thing outside of the signification of body; man would not a be a body in this sense
• Body in this sense is therefore a part of a man (soul is the other part), and not the genus of man; in this sense, man has a body
• “Body” can signify without precision
• In this way, it signifies a certain thing that has such a form due to which 3 dimensions can be designated in it, but it allows that there be further perfections
• Body in this sense will be the genus of animal and man, for it will implicitly contain everything in animal and man; in this sense, man is a body
• [8] Animal stands to man in the same as body to animal

Genus, difference, species each signify the whole essence

• [9] Genus, difference, species and definition signify the whole, but in diverse ways
• Genus signifies whole as a certain denomination determining that which is material in the thing without a determination of the proper form
• It is taken from matter, but is not matter
• Difference signifies whole as a certain denomination taken determinately from the form
• Definition or species signifies the whole and comprehends both the determinate matter (which genus designates) and the determinate form (which difference designates)
• [10] Consequences
• Man is a rational animal, but is not made up of rational and animal
• Conversely, man is made up of body and soul, but is neither body nor soul (Taking body with precision, so that it is a component of man)
• Man is only “composed” of rational and animal, inasmuch as the understanding of man is composed of the understanding of rational and the understanding of animal
• [11] One genus predicated of many does not mean one essence in the many, for the unity of the genus is from indetermination
• [12-14] How “humanity” and “man” signify the essence
• Just as the genus signifies the whole species contained in it implicitly, so the species signifies indistinctly the whole that is essentially in the individual
• “Man” can be predicated of an individual man, and it signifies the whole essence through the mode of a whole
• “Humanity” signifies the whole essence through the mode of a part, for it signifies that by which a man is a man
• Since individuated matted is not that by which a man is a man, it is not included in the signification of the word “humanity”; for this reason, it cannot predicated of an individual man