Maximus, Concrete Universals

Lately, I'm reading a book by von Balthasar on St Maximus the Confessor. It is sometimes very difficult, and my current difficulty is on the meaning of the "concrete universal".

For background, when I first encountered philosophy, it was through the mind of Plato. I was convinced that there were "separated substances" (I didn't yet know that phrase) also known as the Platonic forms, and that every being was what it was through participating in one of these many forms. They were a cause of both being and of knowing. In college, I read lots and lots of Aristotle. As time went on, I refined my use of the word "universal" to what is said of many and to the idea in my mind after I have abstracted it from the here and the now, from its particular conditions. So when I see concrete universal, I think, "A contradiction in terms?" But there's probably more to it than that...

If the universal (the whole) only exists in the mind or in speech, then is there no real unity among the human race? If there were an Idea that caused all men to be such, then they would be one through having a common cause. As it is, I do not think there is some immaterial form between us and God that we participate in to be what we are. We certainly all exist inasmuch as we participate in God's essence, but this is had in common with all creatures. This concern for the unity of humanity is also related to the question of our redemption. "What is not assumed is not redeemed," is the famous axiom of Irenaeus and many early fathers. Therefore, Christ must completely assume human nature--but how can this affect us unless there is some real unity between our nature and his that goes beyond speech and thought?

One thought I had is that relation exists through action/passion or quantity according to Aristotle. Therefore it seems that it is through the action/passion of begetting/begotten that the whole human race is united (or at least related, which would mean some kind of unity). Having Aristotle in mind, I thought of two possibilities:

• The human race has always existed.
• This is almost certainly not held by anyone.
• Yet Aristotle would have held this view, which makes me wonder if he could have thought that all men are related through generation. Perhaps infinite time would mean that inevitably everyone is related to everyone, and actually through infinitely many cycles of ancestors. So I suppose that would do it.
• The human race began to exist.
• This is less messy: all humanity traces back to a pair of parents.
• It can be a little messy since certain evolutionary takes will allow that different communities of men arose in different regions at different times. But do these accept that man is essentially different from other animals? I'm going to assume that. Many of these will reduce all biological operation to the chemical and that to the physical, so that "birth" is not even a category of the real. I'm not talking to those people...not right now.
• So then there are a single pair of parents from which all men sprung.

Now it is said that "in Adam all men sinned." This is bizarre, but because the "universal" was only said of him, whatever he did in the particular was true of all men. (I'm not going to talk about Eve right now...again, too messy. But I do think that will be important.) So when Adam sat, it was true that all men sat. When Adam sinned, all men sinned. So if anyone was ever a "concrete universal," it was probably Adam. And Christ too, who "recapitulated all humanity in himself" and was the second Adam or the last Adam. One problem is that Christ is not related to men through generation (unless somehow his actions affect us through him being a distant relative of our through Mary...not likely). Somehow this notion is involved with our salvation--that's why we are baptized, that is, born again.

Another difficulty with action/passion as basis of unity is that once that action is completed, is the relation only in the past? That seems wrong, since I am the son of my father, but it's not as though he is currently begetting me. Generation is complete. So it seems odd to me that we are related because of an action that is no longer happening.

Now I need to talk about matter. We talked about formal cause (which is only united in the mind, or if Platonic then they are also agents) and agent cause (whether Platonic forms or through generation), but matter is probably bound up with the problem and the solution of what a concrete universal is and if there is such a thing. It is interesting that the form which exists in the mind, gets there by abstracting from matter and material conditions; and yet the only reason there are many individuals under a universal in the first place is because of matter. Material things are necessarily separate on account of having diverse matter--no two material things can be in the same place at the same time. The mind is one place where two material things come together. Bob and George are two distinct beings and will never be in the same physical place, but I can think both of them at once (so they are both in my mind) or can think about their nature (and in this way they are one, in my mind). The matter keeps them apart outside of my mind. The matter does allow for them to be potentially one, like...if Bob ate George. George would cease to be George and Bob would be a little bigger. So probably not the unity we're looking for.

Going back to the concrete universal, Maximus talks about diastole and systole within a universal. The flux of individuals under a universal spreads out or compresses a universal. This is where things start to get confusing, but some simple sentences will (I think) manifest it a bit. If there are no men in America, then "No men in America is true." But through the actions of particular men, universal statements about man change. So if Bob and George discover America, it is now true to say, "Some men are in America." They have changed what is universally true of man!

All right, I think this is making sense. So is concrete universal opposed to abstract universal in that it takes into account all the particularities of individual men whereas the abstract does not take into account any? If that's all, then that's far more clear! There's still the interesting question I have about what really united all men, but at least I'll know what a concrete universal is.

This probably has implications for questions about male and female. It's odd that it belongs to man to be sexed, but that at least two individuals are required to express this diversity and even to reproduce, which is an essential action of man insofar as he is an animal. (Too difficult to think about.) Something to do with matter, why only material things reproduce, and more. This also makes a little sense of why Thomas might have said a female is a defective male--that is, to safeguard the unity of what man is. Most people would probably hope for a better solution to that problem...

Over break, I hope to finish the Maximus book, begin a book on Gregory of Nyssa and then read Thomas on how Christ assumed our nature. Von Balthasar also quotes Hegel more than I would expect (sometimes critically). I do not expect to pick up Hegel soon, but that may be somewhere down the line.

Oh, and final cause does not seem to be sufficient to unite us. All creatures aim at God in some way, but that seems to general to define man (just as with God as our exemplary cause or agent cause). Then again, through the grace of Christ, we do turn to God as our end in a more perfect way than the general natural tendency to good, and this is a cause of the unity of the Church, the body of Christ.

I'm kind of like Descartes sometimes...

(Just so you know, I'm just kind of typing stuff as it comes to mind...)

I've been thinking about Descartes lately and problems I have with him. But then I thought about it more and realized that a lot of his problems are my problems too. Among the many things Descartes learned was the philosophy of Suarez. He probably studied his Disputationes Metaphysicae, where Suarez summarizes all the opinions available on basically every metaphysical topic there is. Descartes sees all of these opposed positions and thinks "Oh no, how can we know who's right?" He responds by taking a radical move--he rejects them all and decides to figure it out by himself. Now it's one thing to try to confirm what one is taught by critiquing the argument or by reducing it to first principles, but to reject being handed on anything from another teacher is problematic.

On the other hand, having picked up Suarez the other day, I now see why he was so intimidated. Whereas in math, you can follow the steps of a proof back to principles or in natural science, where you can (hopefully) repeat experiments that you hear about. It is very easy (in some true sense) to be certain about mathematical and physical matters. Now when one starts talking about the principles of things, it can be much more difficult to attain certitude. A comment or critique that is often thrown at philosophy is "Aren't you just arguing about words?" Unfortunately, this is many times the case! One is merely looking for logical coherency in a set of ideas (Kant?), but a true philosophy looks at things and tries to understand them by their causes.

Descartes not only rejects the teaching of others but he even rejects the evidence of the senses. That's definitely when he goes too far (I'll explain why in a minute...). But my purpose isn't just to point out why Descartes is wrong, but it is to be sympathetic with him. This isn't just Descartes being all, "Teehee, I'm going to destroy perennial philosophy on a whim, and cast the world into doubt and mistrust!" His reaction to Suarez (there are others; I don't want to blame Suarez, but it's a lot easier to say one name) and an over-convoluted philosophy (and I really can't claim to know much about the truth/false of Suarez or how it was presented--excuse the over-generalizations) was mistrust. It's like when someone you trust lies to you and now you don't trust anyone. Or perhaps closer, it is like having two parents who teach you opposite things about the most important matters--it causes a confusion that is difficult to reconcile. The mass of contradictions makes one seek refuge in what is closest--myself.

So Descartes' new starting place, Cogito ergo sum, is now a very lonely one. "Look at me, I'm doing philosophy all by myself with no help from anyone!" Kant too makes it his project to place the a priori principles of all things in his mind so that it is possible to be certain about all without relying on another. He realizes the consequence of what he's doing though: you can't have knowledge about any thing. Eek. Descartes does this thing where he proves God's existence and that God would deceive him, and therefore he an trust his senses and everything is back to normal. Kant realizes that if you start with yourself alone you can only end with yourself alone--that's why Kant makes sure you're mind is pre-programmed with a lot of cool stuff to keep you occupied in the mean time.

But the reason for all this is a desire for certitude! And who doesn't want certitude? I like certitude... The problem is that reality isn't always so certain, so you need to trust. "Oh no, but what if I trust the wrong person?" Yeah, that is a good question. That's why lying is always evil... The fact is that you need to trust someone and you have done so regardless! An infant is wholly dependent, receiving food, comfort, and basic education from others. Within this basic education is language, the tool by which we will communicate with all of those whom we may possibly trust and learn from.

Oh yeah, and the world! Kant eventually gets very particular about what "sense experience" we can trust (it ends up just being the "forms" of sensation, space and time). So what of this world? What of the purpose of philosophy itself which initially sought to understand the meaning of this world, of life, of anything at all? Yeah, it's problematic. Kant keeps it fun by making everything a priori, and I think we can probably learn a lot from what he did, especially about structure of thought and (by coincidence) of things. But it ends up being all form and no content! But we must be contentious. Not really. I was just running out of time and that pun came to mind. I apologize. I'll probably write about this more later, since philosophy, its purpose, our purpose, and so on have all been on my mind lately!

An exhortation: The best philosophy of all is about the best things! So for example, thinking about God is the best because he is the best. Be excellent! Do excellent things! Give people something good to wonder about! It is too often that people begin philosophy in times of doubt or of terror. Let wonder and joy be the beginning!

Freedom is Relative

This may sound obvious, but it seems that whenever one speaks of freedom, it must be understood as freedom from something.

These thoughts are inspired in part by my Trinity professor and this letter by Charles DeKoninck:
http://www.scribd.com/doc/46162378/Letter-by-Charles-DeKoninck-to-Mortimer-Adler-1938

My professor, since the beginning of the year, has dropped hints here and there about the fundamental important of the notion of freedom. My first thought upon hearing this is to look into the Scriptures to see what freedom means there. In the Old Testament, it is freedom from slavery or from one's enemies. In the New Testament, it is freedom from sin and the things of this world. In both cases, it is a freedom from something for the sake of worshiping God. Every morning at prayer we say, "He has set us free from the hands of our enemies, free to worship him without fear, holy and righteous in his sight all the days of our life." And this seems to be the notion of freedom present throughout the Scriptures.

The question then comes of God's freedom. It is interesting that St Thomas does not set aside a quaestio for the consideration of God's freedom. This makes more sense though if we notice that the first 43 questions of the Summa consider God as he is in himself, i.e., from all eternity. Obviously we must begin with creatures in our understanding of goodness, perfection, life, love, and and so on. Yet from these many created realities, we come to understand more fully the one unchanging divine nature. So excluded from this section are any considerations of God as Lord, Creator, and as Free. God is certainly free, but what does this mean but free from the power of any creature? All creatures depend on him. The Psalm for evening prayer tonight is 139. This Psalm emphasizes the thoroughness of God's knowledge regarding his creatures:

O Lord, you search me and you know me,
you know my resting and my rising,
you discern my purpose from afar.
You mark when I walk or lie down,
all my ways lie open to you.

Before ever a word is on my tongue
you know it, O Lord, through and through.
Behind and before you besiege me,
your hand ever laid upon me.
Too wonderful for me, this knowledge,
too high, beyond my reach.

This knowledge referred to by the Psalm is that God knows even those things that depend on human freedom. Going on, the Psalmist talks more about how all of our actions are known by him, "written in his book."

Already you knew my soul,
my body held no secret from you
when I was being fashioned in secret
and molded in the depths of the earth.
Your eyes saw all my actions,
they were all of them written in your book,
every one of my days was decreed
before one of them came into being.

To me, how mysterious your thoughts,
the sum of them not to be numbered!
If I count them, they are more than the sand;
to finish, I must be eternal, like you.

So whatever kind of freedom man has, it seems that we never have a freedom from God, in the sense that we are apart from him in a way that allows to do what we otherwise could not. Truly all of our freedom is from God insofar as he makes us free, but only insofar as he makes us free from sin and from attachment to creatures. Now some will hear this and think that God is being violent or forceful, but this is comes from thinking of God as a creature or as something else opposed to our happiness. Other cases of the higher leading the lower make clear that the lower is elevated by this. The soul/will/mind moves the body--if it didn't, the body would lie in a heap. The parent moves/feeds/changes the child and this leads to the health and benefit of the child. God does more, far more, and for every creature, and the only ones that in some way can turn away from this are men and angels. Yet even they do not escape God altogether, for the Lord orders all things sweetly and he will dispose even sin unto his glory. Jesus Christ manifests his glory most brilliantly in freeing us from sin.

I will have to go back to St Thomas and consider carefully what he says regarding freedom in the places where he talks about, especially when he talks about the freedom of God. One question that I always have is how it is that God freely creates? I had a brief post asking that earlier. It is at least certain to me that creation does not itself cause him to create it, i.e., nothing outside of him forces him to create. For then what is this thing that has a power over God? So no. But can it be said that God necessarily creates, though not necessitated from without? I don't like how it sounds, but I haven't yet seen the problem with it. Surely St Thomas considers this in various places as well. I'll post some findings later if I have time.

The DeKoninck letter has more interesting considerations of person, nature, incommunicability, and so on. That in God the Word proceeding is identical with the Son begotten is interesting. In the Old Testament, it was through begetting offspring that the promise was passed on; in the New Testament, it is through the preaching the word that men inherit the promise. This is all contained in God's interior life. Nature communicates itself. Knowledge is to have the other as other. So many things to consider.

Unity in Diversity

Lately I've been thinking about what it means to be one and how it is possible for many to be one. This is just going to be a handful of thoughts...

Here's one article that made me think about it:
https://docs.google.com/file/d/0B1LariKu6m5TS09Nc21xMDlhVGs/edit?usp=sharing

Even before reading that, I had lately been thinking about how diversity is the condition for the greatest forms of unity. An illustration: what is more one, a cup of water or a man? Now certainly the water is more uniform in its constitution, whereas man is made up of so many diverse parts which are sometimes more less essential. Yet the man has a unity which the water does not. You can take a cup of water and divide it in two without having changed it very much--you could put the parts back together and it would be as if nothing happened. Man on the other hand has such a unity that if you cut something off, it will probably not attach as easily and (depending on what you cut off) it might make that man cease to be a man altogether.

It's interesting that the greatest mysteries of the Faith also involve unity, not unity without distinction, but a higher sort of unity. I believe in one God. A fairly simple statement. Yet of God I will say The Father is God, the Son is God, the Holy Spirit is God and also The Father is not the Son, the Son is not the Father, and the Holy Spirit is not the Father or the Son. One in essence, one in everything, except that by which they are opposed: relative opposition. This relative opposition is all that distinguishes the persons who are one God.

Then the other great mystery of the Faith: the Incarnation. Jesus Christ is true God and true man, yet he is not two persons on account of this. Jesus Christ is one person who is eternally God and assumed human nature to himself, not such that he was joined to a person distinct from himself, but so that he the divine Word was indeed man without ceasing to be God.

Those are the most extreme cases, where the unity and the distinction are greater than found anywhere else.

Another example where distinction is necessary for unity: producing offspring. Perhaps the most interesting aspect of evolutionary biology is the how the diversity of sexes came to be. If asexual organisms are capable of reproducing without aid from another, why would they change so that diversity of sex would be necessary for reproduction? Similar questions have come to my mind: Is it better to be a plant than to be an animal since you're able to make your own food without moving? Or even as above, is it better to be water since you don't need to eat at all? The answer is probably no. Although being a man is far more difficult than being any other kind of material creature, it is certainly worth the effort.

Yes, a live-action picture of mitosis

So also for sexual diversity. At first, it seems like a step backwards. Now two creatures different in kind must interact in order to propogate the species. But upon reflection (and I would like to read more in this area), there are tons of benefits. First, it allows for diversity in a genetic pool so that if there is some sort of disease, it is more likely that some part of the species will outlive it. Second, with two sexes, there is a kind of specialization that occurs, a sort of "division of labor". The male animal (creature?) produces many, many small sex cells. This ability to produce many and more often allows him to be more mobile, more active. The female animal produces one large, sex cell (or perhaps a sacful) which is rich in nutrients and will be the place where the next organism develops.

[I'm skimming Wikipedia as I write this. Found a great quote: "A third theory is that sex evolved as a form of cannibalism. One primitive organism ate another one, but rather than completely digesting it, some of the 'eaten' organism's DNA was incorporated into the 'eater' organism." That's pretty gnarly...]

Having looked at sexuality on merely a biological level, there is also the social level. Skipping person to person friendships (not because they're unimportant), some of the greatest things simply speaking involve the diversity of many members. Three examples: the universe, the state, and the Church. St Thomas argues that the greatest good in the universe is the very order of the universe itself (God is the greatest good outside the universe). Because this includes every creature, but in such a way that each one is fittingly related to every other creature, this will certainly outdo any other order of diverse things to be found in the universe.

The state is another important example. This is hard to see for many, since our government is pretty lame sometimes, etc. But a state is more than its government! It's you and me, and the people who own the grocery store, and the people who work at McDonald's, and the people who start and educate and study and schools. A state is constituted by many persons who all share a common life in some way or another. Whatever problems there are, this order is present and always at work even if you do not notice. I'm not in constant fear of my life. Not because I could take on anyone who came at me with a knife, but because I'm surrounding by people who are formed in virtue (to the extent that they wouldn't do that) and those who would like to do it are dissuaded by the laws and the customs that bring upon them all sorts of unpleasant consequences. Also, if I didn't live in a state, I would have to kill/grow/scavange for everything I ate. Ain't nobody got no time for that. And learning too: I would have to discover everything on my own.

And then there is the Church. This is what is described in 1 Corinthians 12, especially with the image of the Church as the Body of Christ. We started by contrasting the human body with the uniformity of water. This ordered diversity, as it is assumed in Christ, then becomes the image of the unity of the entire community of those in the Church. In a later post, I will go back to considering the kingdom of heaven (especially as in Matthew) and how the descriptions of Christ always involve, not only the God, but also the bad who have a role in the story of the kingdom of heaven. This resolving of the good and evil (which is always involved in the kingdom of heaven) is still distinct from the unity of the members in the body of Christ (who are apostles, prophets, teachers, etc.) and also the unity of the head with the body, of Christ with Church, of a husband and his spouse.

And there's always more... Like friendship. And how this all relates to the mind. And music. And art. And Hegel, "Matter is to gravity as spirit is to freedom." But more later.

Thoughts on Person, Relation, Family

This post is really just going to be a handful of quotes and thoughts.

Friendship seems to hold states together, and lawgivers apparently devote more attention to it than to justice. For concord seems to be something similar to friendship, and concord is what they most strive to attain, while they do their best to expel faction, the enemy of concord. When people are friends, they have no need of justice, but when they are just, they need friendship in addition. In fact, the just in the fullest sense is regarded as constituting an element of friendship. Friendship is noble as well as necessary: we praise those who love their friends and consider the possession of many friends a noble thing. And further, we believe of our friends that they are good men. (Nicomachean Ethics, 8.1, at the beginning of Aristotle's consideration of friendship)

Relativity toward the other constitutes the human person. The human person is the event or being of relativity. (Joseph Ratzinger, Concerning the Notion of Person in Theology)

"Pope Paul VI noted that “the world is in trouble because of the lack of thinking”. He was making an observation, but also expressing a wish: a new trajectory of thinking is needed in order to arrive at a better understanding of the implications of our being one family; interaction among the peoples of the world calls us to embark upon this new trajectory, so that integration can signify solidarity rather than marginalization. Thinking of this kind requires a deeper critical evaluation of the category of relation. This is a task that cannot be undertaken by the social sciences alone, insofar as the contribution of disciplines such as metaphysics and theology is needed if man's transcendent dignity is to be properly understood." (Pope Benedict, Caritas in Veritate)

The third reason [against marrying blood relations] is, because this would hinder a man from having many friends: since through a man taking a stranger to wife, all his wife's relations are united to him by a special kind of friendship, as though they were of the same blood as himself. Wherefore Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xv, 16): "The demands of charity are most perfectly satisfied by men uniting together in the bonds that the various ties of friendship require, so that they may live together in a useful and becoming amity; nor should one man have many relationships in one, but each should have one." (Summa, II-II.159.9)


All right, those are all the quotes I wanted to bring together. The one quote from Aristotle has long been on my mind since it sounds odd when first heard: legislators care most about friendship. When we think of lawmakers, this is not the first thing that comes to mind, but giving it a few minutes of thoughts, that certainly seems like the way to go. Laws bring about justice for the sake of this higher good, friendship. If everything were just but nobody had friends, that would be a very poor state. A state with many friendships and strong friendships would seem to be the ideal.

The Ratzinger quote is one that I have puzzled over for sometime. Is he saying that a person is relation, or even that relation is somehow prior to a person being a person? Those statements both seem odd. Yet it is true that every persons is potentially related (to all other persons) and even necessarily actually related to at least two persons upon coming into existence. It is also the case that only persons can have the kinds of relations that are noble (i.e. friendship). So the capacity for friendship (I will call this relation, meaning this limited sense) is a property of the person, in the sense that only persons can be friends and all persons can be friends.

I want to note here that person does not name a nature, so it is interesting that I can point out a property. There are other properties (having intellect and will), so perhaps its not too odd, but I did want it to be noticed that these are not properties of a nature, but of something else.

These relations really seems to be what a person is made for. Aristotle speaks very highly of friendship, saying that life would not be worth living apart from it, yet goes on to say that our happiness consists in a contemplative act. His argument for this is from our nature, to which it is proper to know. That contemplation/seeing is certainly our happiness is beyond doubt. Yet there is more to be said, and what is seen is also to be considered. He says (I'm being vaguer than he) that the object of contemplation must be the highest thing for it to constitute our happiness. Yet in the two preceding books he talked about the glory of a friend and how one reason friends are so great is that one can contemplate the highest things in his friend. So it seems the object of the perfect sight is likely to be a friend.

Toward the end (this is just my memory) he says the object are the gods. Now surely, something divine is the highest object, right? I think so. Yet to see the divine, not only as other or as higher, but as friend is surely a far greater happiness. I do not know what Aristotle could have known about the personality of God, yet I think he would agree that to behold a friend is better than not to behold a friend, and that to behold God is better than not to; therefore, to behold God as friend is the highest of all.

Now it is a person that has a relationship. This is most clearly seen in the Christological disputes that took place. We call Mary the Mother of God because she bore Christ, a person who is divine. She did not beget a nature, but a person. I was not born of "parenthood", but of my mother and my father who became related to me when I was conceived.

(I wish my thinking was more complete and orderly on this. I'm really just writing where my mind goes, but I'm leaving out tons of stuff that I think is worth saying...)

There was a TIME magazine cover recently about how childless couples seem to be happier than those without children. Just about everyone I know was disgusted by this cover. Nope, I haven't read the article, but here is the cover: http://www.time.com/time/covers/0,16641,20130812,00.html "The Childfree Life: When having it all means not having children." Someone seems to be missing something. That most parents would give away everything they have to care for their child should be a sign that a child is something very special, something not entirely understood, but something loved--someone loved. It's a person! And the dignity/worth/awesomeness of this person is most made manifest through relation. It's nice that every child is born within at least two relations (this reminds me of a board game called Catan, where everyone automatically starts with 2 points; and yes, I just gave nature a compliment). A developing person is one that is learning to form and grow in relationships with others. If a child learned to eat, drink, dress himself, sleep, work, pay bills, study and entertain himself, but did not have any relationships with others, it would be safe to say that something went wrong, the child had not yet finished growing.

In the context of a family, one is immediately tied to others by familial bonds. First are the parents already mentioned several times, and then there are the siblings. I have trouble imagining life without siblings. They are persons who have a common origin, common experiences, often common likes and dislikes, common appearances, a common name, and common relatives! Whereas this can take many years to develop with another persons, in the context of the family, one is born into it. How wonderful! Meeting cousins is always wonderful, because there is at once a newness and a familiarity. This kind of relationship is so good that St. Thomas in the quote about talks about how marrying those of another family is wonderful, precisely because it increases the number of relationships like this.

I had a thought regarding the childless. Aristotle says that the ideal state is one that has as its end the common good. Less perfect states are those that aim at less common goods. Another premise, a common good is one's own good. All right, now someone who does not have children (or at least younger relatives or younger friends) will seem to have little or no interest for laws unless they affect someone of their own age group. This would be detrimental to a state which is to last from one generation to the next. On the other hand, those who have descendants (I read of an Israeli woman who recently died--she had 1400 living descendants) will be concerned that laws are framed such that they will benefit not only their own generation, but even those to come.

This makes me want to read The Republic again, paying special attention to the state invented there. Socrates suggests having children and wives in common, and yet by doing this the special relationships among them would be diminished. This is why Marx's plan leads to the destruction of the person. After reading that again, I will want to read book 2 of Aristotle's Politics where he criticizes it. Here is one line from chapter 3: "Each of the citizens comes to have a thousand sons, though not as an individual, but each in a similar fashion the son of any of them; hence all will slight them in similar fashion." And another: "It is better to have a cousin of one's own than to have a son in the sense indicated." Oh, and another! "It is impossible to avoid some who suspect who their brothers, parents, etc. actually are." That is to say, we are provided by such relations by nature.

There's some great stuff here. A quote from chapter 4: "We suppose affection to be the greatest of good things for cities." and "There are two things above all which make human beings cherish and feel affection, what is one's own and what is dear."

Another brief note. Some will say "Why are you looking to Aristotle's Politics for wisdom about political life and family relations? Doesn't he encourage slavery?" Two answers: one, he takes slavery as a given and then tries to understand its place within the whole of political and economic life. (I sometimes want to point out that the tasks done by slaves have not gone away: they still need to be done. Though I will grant that slavery and employed labor are not the same thing. That can be a long conversation for later..) The second encouragement to study the Politics comes from Blessed John Paul II! Here's a quote: "Returning to Aristotle, we should add that, as well as the Nicomachean Ethics, he also left us a work on social ethics. It is entitled Politics. Here, without addressing questions concerning the concrete strategies of political life, Aristotle limits himself to defining the ethical principles on which any just political system should be based. Catholic social teaching owes much to Aristotle’s Politics and has acquired particular prominence in modern times, thanks to the issue of labor." So that's encouraging. Read the whole of that chapter here: http://www.jknirp.com/mandi.htm

Rereading that chapter just now, I noticed how much the Blessed Pope talks about freedom, which he also defines: "Freedom, for Aristotle, is a property of the will which is realized through truth. It is given to man as a task to be accomplished. There is no freedom without truth." How wonderful! Freedom is often identified with autonomy, being able to do what one wants without anyone's help or burden; the freedom John Paul speaks of is something which is open to others because it is open to truth. The Pope mentions many documents about such freedom and how it stands to human relations, especially noting Gaudium et Spes. I'm putting that at the top of my queue now...

Speaking of relation, my sister coincidentally posted a status on Facebook that seems capture something of what I'm trying to get at:
"While over the summer I was exposed to sickening amounts of profanity and blows of blatant sexism, these same men could become the most sensitive and heartfelt when talking about one subject: thier wives. Like an excited child talking about Christmas, each one would talk about her unique, timeless beauty, often showing me pictures. They would tell of her sweetness, intelligence, her motherly wisdom. Their love was so great for their wives. With overtime there is rejoicing, since they are already away from home and their wives aren't at the hotel. Weekend work? A silence of sorrow. This marvelous sweetness and passion turned an awful day around, restoring a little hope in love. Thank you. And yet, they didn't share for my sake; they just couldn't keep from talking about the one they love."

Yep, that sums it up.