At the request of a brother seminarian, I'm going to try to put in concise terms my understanding of St. Thomas' teaching on the Trinity. I'm mostly posting this here to remind myself that I had set out to do this so that when I come across this months after forgetting this project, I may then resume. Yes, I think it may be a very long time before I finish, and I have great doubts that I will. I think the final project will be very short if it comes out and perhaps obscure due to my attention to things I find interesting rather than to what is most essential. May God bless my endeavors nonetheless! Saint Thomas, pray for us!
Here's the link (mostly for my sake): https://docs.google.com/document/d/1kNvWb3-oG5FP1P6FO_gL_lpJxKlmAn28ozvMN3gCEFM/edit?usp=sharing
Showing posts with label thomas. Show all posts
Showing posts with label thomas. Show all posts
Sunday, July 20, 2014
Friday, December 27, 2013
III.2, Hypostases and more
Question 2 in the Tertia Pars is all about the mode of union in the Incarnation.
Having read Maximus and things about Maximus lately, I've been careful to listen for any important distinctions between hypostasis and persons, but as far as Saint Thomas is concerned, person only specifies the nature of the hypostasis--he repeats this several times in this question. At one point, he distinguishes individual substance from hypostasis which are not commonly distinguished, but hypostasis adds the notion of completion. It seems that St Thomas is calling the humanity of Christ an individual substance, but not a hypostasis since it is in the Word that it exists. In 2.6, Thomas makes the interesting claim that the hypostasis is "midway" between the nature and the accidents, so that substantial union or accidental union are extremes of which the hypostatic union is a mean. This is interesting. Hypostasis is a mean at least in that it shares something with the accounts of nature and accident: both nature and hypostasis share the name "substance" and are not in something, whereas hypostasis is closer to accidents than nature in that hypostasis is the subject of accidents.
And so there is then the question of Christ's esse. When Thomas talks about whether the union of the Incarnation is created, he says that it is created because it begins to be. So there is created esse in the humanity of Christ. And yet it is the hypostasis that exists completely, and later on (17.2, though I didn't look closely) where Thomas will say that Christ has only one esse and not two. So then which will it be? The esse of the Word is uncreated and the same with the Father and the Spirit, no? Yet the humanity and union itself is created, so does not Christ have created esse? I suppose I will find out in due time... Another note, St Thomas talks about "personal esse" (Christ's union) and how this cannot be merited, unlike habitual grace (like we have in our soul) which can be merited in a certain way. One more note: In 2.7.ad3, to-be-created pertains more to esse than to relation; here esse refers to the union/nature whereas relation indicates the person. More familiar example: that I am created has to do with my esse and not my relation (neither to my parents nor even to God, since that relation is logically consequent to my esse).
In 2.9, there is a rare case in the Summa of Thomas replying to the Sed contra and disputing the authority of St Augustine! Augustine claims that humanity is more in the Son than the Son is in the Father. St Thomas says he is wrong, and yet says the humanity of Christ is united to the Son in a hypostasis (they are the same person) whereas the Father and the Son are not the same person, but wholly one according to nature and power. I'm inclined to agree with St Thomas, and yet there's something that makes me want to consider it further (and perhaps read Augustine in context). Earlier in the Summa, Thomas says the "Father" is said per prius of the person and per posterius of the Godhead. So would the unity of the person somehow be greater than that of the Godhead? (Remember, God is absolutely one; the only distinction within God is relative--real, but relative.)
At this point, I am looking forward to question 17 which contains only two articles: Is Christ one or two? And does he have only one esse? I also want to write something clear and consistent (and true) about the distinction between in re and in ratione. This distinction is very important in understanding God's tri-unity, and does not stop being important in considering the incarnation. It is surprising to read how created the Incarnation is, and yet how thoroughly divine. His treatment of Nestorius position is helpful as well, since he gleans a lot of the positive things in his teaching. He even calls one position in the Sentences worse than Nestorius. Oh my.
Having read Maximus and things about Maximus lately, I've been careful to listen for any important distinctions between hypostasis and persons, but as far as Saint Thomas is concerned, person only specifies the nature of the hypostasis--he repeats this several times in this question. At one point, he distinguishes individual substance from hypostasis which are not commonly distinguished, but hypostasis adds the notion of completion. It seems that St Thomas is calling the humanity of Christ an individual substance, but not a hypostasis since it is in the Word that it exists. In 2.6, Thomas makes the interesting claim that the hypostasis is "midway" between the nature and the accidents, so that substantial union or accidental union are extremes of which the hypostatic union is a mean. This is interesting. Hypostasis is a mean at least in that it shares something with the accounts of nature and accident: both nature and hypostasis share the name "substance" and are not in something, whereas hypostasis is closer to accidents than nature in that hypostasis is the subject of accidents.
And so there is then the question of Christ's esse. When Thomas talks about whether the union of the Incarnation is created, he says that it is created because it begins to be. So there is created esse in the humanity of Christ. And yet it is the hypostasis that exists completely, and later on (17.2, though I didn't look closely) where Thomas will say that Christ has only one esse and not two. So then which will it be? The esse of the Word is uncreated and the same with the Father and the Spirit, no? Yet the humanity and union itself is created, so does not Christ have created esse? I suppose I will find out in due time... Another note, St Thomas talks about "personal esse" (Christ's union) and how this cannot be merited, unlike habitual grace (like we have in our soul) which can be merited in a certain way. One more note: In 2.7.ad3, to-be-created pertains more to esse than to relation; here esse refers to the union/nature whereas relation indicates the person. More familiar example: that I am created has to do with my esse and not my relation (neither to my parents nor even to God, since that relation is logically consequent to my esse).
In 2.9, there is a rare case in the Summa of Thomas replying to the Sed contra and disputing the authority of St Augustine! Augustine claims that humanity is more in the Son than the Son is in the Father. St Thomas says he is wrong, and yet says the humanity of Christ is united to the Son in a hypostasis (they are the same person) whereas the Father and the Son are not the same person, but wholly one according to nature and power. I'm inclined to agree with St Thomas, and yet there's something that makes me want to consider it further (and perhaps read Augustine in context). Earlier in the Summa, Thomas says the "Father" is said per prius of the person and per posterius of the Godhead. So would the unity of the person somehow be greater than that of the Godhead? (Remember, God is absolutely one; the only distinction within God is relative--real, but relative.)
At this point, I am looking forward to question 17 which contains only two articles: Is Christ one or two? And does he have only one esse? I also want to write something clear and consistent (and true) about the distinction between in re and in ratione. This distinction is very important in understanding God's tri-unity, and does not stop being important in considering the incarnation. It is surprising to read how created the Incarnation is, and yet how thoroughly divine. His treatment of Nestorius position is helpful as well, since he gleans a lot of the positive things in his teaching. He even calls one position in the Sentences worse than Nestorius. Oh my.
Tuesday, December 24, 2013
Tertia Pars Begins
I recently received the 8 vol. Latin-English Summa for Christmas! Since in taking Christology next semester, I will be taking along the Tertia Pars, hopefully reading the whole if it. I couldn't wait to get started, so I already read the first quaestio. A couple points stood out.
The first is St. Thomas' main reason for the fittingness of the incarnation: it is fitting for the invisible to be made visible so that it may be known. The incarnation is what comes to mind right away when one heard this premise, but this also the purpose of every word we speak and even every action we do. The material world is really at its best when it serves as a sign of a hidden reality, whether it is the nature of a thing, the mind or heart of a man, or God in his wisdom and power. Our bodies (although truly parts of us and not mere instruments) are signs of our interior life: where they go, whether they are healthy, what they do, who they are with. Certainly there accidental things that happen to them inasmuch as they are bodies an engage other bodies, but as long as they are our bodies, we are incapable of communicating without them. In the incarnation, God communicates himself completely through taking on a body (and soul!) which men can see, feels, and hear. This is what we celebrate on Christmas!
One more quick point is his arguments for why Christ did not come at beginning or at the end of the world. Christ is at once what is perfected and what perfects, so it is fitting that he come in the middle. He a perfected in being united to God, he perfects by uniting humanity to himself. One person! It is interesting that St. Thomas gets at the core of the incarnation in this first question, that seems at first to be merely a preface. Christ is God and man, perfected and perfected, beginning and end. Now he will explain what this means.
So that I stay consistent this semester and really absorb what I am reading, I now resolve to write at least a brief post each time I finish a question. This is my first one.
Sent from my iPhone
The first is St. Thomas' main reason for the fittingness of the incarnation: it is fitting for the invisible to be made visible so that it may be known. The incarnation is what comes to mind right away when one heard this premise, but this also the purpose of every word we speak and even every action we do. The material world is really at its best when it serves as a sign of a hidden reality, whether it is the nature of a thing, the mind or heart of a man, or God in his wisdom and power. Our bodies (although truly parts of us and not mere instruments) are signs of our interior life: where they go, whether they are healthy, what they do, who they are with. Certainly there accidental things that happen to them inasmuch as they are bodies an engage other bodies, but as long as they are our bodies, we are incapable of communicating without them. In the incarnation, God communicates himself completely through taking on a body (and soul!) which men can see, feels, and hear. This is what we celebrate on Christmas!
One more quick point is his arguments for why Christ did not come at beginning or at the end of the world. Christ is at once what is perfected and what perfects, so it is fitting that he come in the middle. He a perfected in being united to God, he perfects by uniting humanity to himself. One person! It is interesting that St. Thomas gets at the core of the incarnation in this first question, that seems at first to be merely a preface. Christ is God and man, perfected and perfected, beginning and end. Now he will explain what this means.
So that I stay consistent this semester and really absorb what I am reading, I now resolve to write at least a brief post each time I finish a question. This is my first one.
Sent from my iPhone
Tuesday, September 24, 2013
1 Corinthians 14, first look with St Thomas
Chapter 14 of First Corinthians is an extended consideration of two charismata in particular: prophecy and speaking in tongues (and a brief mention of interpretation of tongues). Speaking in tongues is the gift most often associated with the "Charismatic Movement", so it will be helpful to understand that better. And also, since prophecy is a better gift and St Paul wants us all to seek it (Desire the spiritual gifts, especially that you may prophesy), this too is worth considering.
In the commentary on 12, St Thomas said about these gifts:
In the commentary on 12, St Thomas said about these gifts:
- prophecy is the grace to manifest what is known to God alone (such as future contingents)
- speaking in tongues allows one to overcome the barrier of language
- interpretation of tongues allows one to understand the difficult words of Scripture
In Chapter 14, however, St Paul talks about speaking in tongues as not understandable by men and as only edifying oneself, rather than the whole community. Let's see what St Thomas has to say about this... An outline is always a good way to start.
- Prophecy excels the gift of tongues
- reasons on account of the nonbelievers
- More useful in exhortation (5-12)
- More useful in praying (13-17)
- reasons on account of the believers
- How the gifts of prophecy and tongues should be used
Early on, St Thomas says "For the explanation of the entire chapter, three things need to be known beforehand: (1) what is prophecy, (2) how many kinds of prophecy are in Scripture, (3) what is speaking in tongues."
- Prophecy is the sight or manifestation of future contingents or of things transcending human understanding
- Four things are required for this
- An image in the imagination which is the likeness of the thing shown
- Intellectual light which allows the intellect to know beyond natural knowledge
- Nebuchadnezzar and Pharoah had dreams but were not prophets; Daniel and Joseph interpreted the dreams and were prophets
- Courage to announce the things revealed
- Working of miracles which lends certitude for prophecy
- Prophets differ inasmuch as they possess these four things differently
- The prophecy referred to in this chapter belongs to one who "has the intellectual light to explain imaginary visions made to himself or someone else"
- The gift of tongues is the actual speaking of foreign languages
- As for this chapter, "When the Apostle mentions here about speaking in a tongue, he means an unknown language not interpreted; as when one might speak German to a Frenchman without an interpreter, he is speaking in a tongues. Hence, all speech neither understood nor explained, no matter what it is, is properly called speaking in a tongue." St Thomas says "whatever speech" because any speech that is truly such (and not just noise) has some meaning, whether it is known or not.
What is meant by speaking in tongues becomes more clear when he comments on verse 5 (I'm paraphrasing):
- He says that men are sometimes moved by the Holy Spirit to speak something mystical, which they do not understand--this person has the gift of tongues
- One who speaks in tongues and interpret is better than one who is prophet--because to interpret difficult things is what the prophet does (so St Thomas here seems to identify the prophet and the interpreter of tongues); so such a one is both a prophet and has the gift of tongues
In verse 6, St Paul talks about his own gift to speak in tongues:
- This can mean either foreign languages or any speech (sign) that is not understood
- Things about which Paul speaks:
- revelation, by which the mind is enlightened to know divine things
- knowledge, that is, about earthly things that leads to building up of faith (Thomas interestingly excludes geometry and astronomy...)
- prophecy, which is about future events (this is more particular than the sense above)
- doctrine, which is about moral acts
He finishes his account of verse 11 by exhorting us, "Don't be barbarians to one another."
That's all I'm going to do for now. I'll probably write more on this later.
Saturday, September 21, 2013
Charismatic Gifts, Division of 1 Corinthians 12
Recently I've talked with many who associate themselves with the "charismatic" movement in the Church. Seeking clarity in understanding, I go to St. Thomas to see what he has to say... The following is from his commentary on First Corinthians, the place in Scripture that deals most with the charismata. Outlines will now commence.
After the greeting, the main division is:
What the translator calls "charismatic graces" are called "gratiis gratis data" by St. Thomas. Graces given by grace? Another translation I found was "gratuitous graces", which means about the same. The word "charismatic" comes from the Greek for gift or grace, so that's probably a good translation too. I'll keep calling them "charismatic graces", since that's easier and more normal sounding than the Latin or the phrase "gratuitous graces". Also, it will hopefully have a connection with what is meant by those in the charismatic movement.
Now the whole commentary on chapter 12 is about 20 pages (really 10, since the pages are Latin/English). First, I'm going to just copy and paste the text, outlining according to St. Thomas. This could be messy. I will provide explanation within it, in brackets. And I'll probably break up the outline as convenience requires.
[Distribution of graces]
4 Now there are varieties of gifts, but the same Spirit; 5 and there are varieties of service, but the same Lord; 6 and there are varieties of working, but it is the same God who inspires them all in every one.
[Distinction of specific graces, 12:8-10]
Chapter 14 and its commentary is somewhat longer, but goes into detail about two particular charismata: prophecy and speaking in tongues, comparing the two and explaining their proper use.
After the greeting, the main division is:
- Things pertaining to all: the sacraments (ch. 1-15)
- Things pertaining to some (ch. 16)
- The sacraments themselves (1-11)
- Baptism (1-4)
- Matrimony (5-7)
- Eucharist (8-11)
- The thing signified and contained by them: grace (12-14)
- Charismatic graces (12)
- Charity, which is prefered above all these (13)
- Comparison of charismatic graces (14)
- The thing signified but not contained: glory (15)
What the translator calls "charismatic graces" are called "gratiis gratis data" by St. Thomas. Graces given by grace? Another translation I found was "gratuitous graces", which means about the same. The word "charismatic" comes from the Greek for gift or grace, so that's probably a good translation too. I'll keep calling them "charismatic graces", since that's easier and more normal sounding than the Latin or the phrase "gratuitous graces". Also, it will hopefully have a connection with what is meant by those in the charismatic movement.
Now the whole commentary on chapter 12 is about 20 pages (really 10, since the pages are Latin/English). First, I'm going to just copy and paste the text, outlining according to St. Thomas. This could be messy. I will provide explanation within it, in brackets. And I'll probably break up the outline as convenience requires.
- [He states his intention]
- 1 Now concerning spiritual gifts, brethren, I do not want you to be uninformed.
- [He follow his intention]
- [He shows the need for spiritual graces]
- 2 You know that when you were heathen, you were led astray to dumb idols, however you may have been moved.
- 3 Therefore I want you to understand that no one speaking by the Spirit of God ever says "Jesus be cursed!" and no one can say "Jesus is Lord" except by the Holy Spirit.
- [He presents the distribution of graces, v. 7-31]
[Distribution of graces]
4 Now there are varieties of gifts, but the same Spirit; 5 and there are varieties of service, but the same Lord; 6 and there are varieties of working, but it is the same God who inspires them all in every one.
- [Manifestation of the division of graces]
- [Division of specific graces]
- [Lays down condition of charimatic graces]
- 7 To each is given the manifestation of the Spirit for the common good.
- [Distinguishes them, v. 8-10]
- [Describes their action, responds to errors]
- 11 All these are inspired by one and the same Spirit, who apportions to each one individually as he wills.
- [He applies a likeness]
- 12 For just as the body is one and has many members, and all the members of the body, though many, are one body, so it is with Christ. 13 For by one Spirit we were all baptized into one body--Jews or Greeks, slaves or free--and all were made to drink of one Spirit. 14 For the body does not consist of one member but of many. 15 If the foot should say, "Because I am not a hand, I do not belong to the body," that would not make it any less a part of the body. 16 And if the ear should say, "Because I am not an eye, I do not belong to the body," that would not make it any less a part of the body. 17 If the whole body were an eye, where would be the hearing? If the whole body were an ear, where would be the sense of smell? 18 But as it is, God arranged the organs in the body, each one of them, as he chose. 19 If all were a single organ, where would the body be? 20 As it is, there are many parts, yet one body. 21 The eye cannot say to the hand, "I have no need of you," nor again the head to the feet, "I have no need of you." 22 On the contrary, the parts of the body which seem to be weaker are indispensable, 23 and those parts of the body which we think less honorable we invest with the greater honor, and our unpresentable parts are treated with greater modesty, 24 which our more presentable parts do not require. But God has so composed the body, giving the greater honor to the inferior part, 25 that there may be no discord in the body, but that the members may have the same care for one another. 26 If one member suffers, all suffer together; if one member is honored, all rejoice together. 27 Now you are the body of Christ and individually members of it.
- [Division of operations {ministrationum}]
- [Assigns order of ministries]
- [Principal ministries]
- 28 And God has appointed in the church first apostles, second prophets, third teachers, then workers of miracles, then healers,
- [Secondary ministries]
- helpers, administrators, speakers in various kinds of tongues.
- [Manifests distinctions among them]
- 29 Are all apostles? Are all prophets? Are all teachers? Do all work miracles? 30 Do all possess gifts of healing? Do all speak with tongues? Do all interpret?
- [Orders their affections for ministries and graces]
- 31 But earnestly desire the higher gifts. And I will show you a still more excellent way.
[Distinction of specific graces, 12:8-10]
- [Faculty of persuading]
- [about divine things] 8 To one is given through the Spirit the utterance of wisdom,
- [about creatures] and to another the utterance of knowledge according to the same Spirit,
- [about matters of faith] 9 to another faith by the same Spirit,
- [Faculty of confirming persuasion through divine signs]
- [Something only God can do]
- [with benefit] to another gifts of healing by the one Spirit,
- [without benefit] 10 to another the working of miracles,
- [Something only God can know]
- [future contingents] to another prophecy,
- [the human heart] to another the ability to distinguish between spirits,
- [Faculty of proposing persuasion intelligibly]
- [to overcome language barrier] to another various kinds of tongues,
- [to explain what is obscure in Scripture] to another the interpretation of tongues.
Chapter 14 and its commentary is somewhat longer, but goes into detail about two particular charismata: prophecy and speaking in tongues, comparing the two and explaining their proper use.
Thursday, September 19, 2013
Karl Barth, Trinity, thoughts
So I'm taking a Trinity class this semester. The text is pretty good (it's St. Thomas!) but the professor is confusing sometimes (he thinks the principle of contradiction doesn't apply to God...), so I have to think harder than usual.
It's clear that the professor doesn't completely agree St. Thomas on every point in his consideration on the Trinity. My difficulty: Where else does one go to find an alternate account? I read a little of St. Gregory Nazianzus (Oratio 31), and in it I saw the doctrine of St. Thomas. I suspect that if I read St. Augustine or Hilary or Basil, I would see accounts that remind me very much of what St. Thomas says. A rejection of his account would seem in some ways to be a rejection of the Fathers, since his thought is really a synthesis of their thought. Walking through the shelves of the library, I saw for the first time Karl Barth's Church Dogmatics. I've read about Karl Barth (a Reformed theologian of sorts) but never seen this huge work. I picked it up to look at what he has to say about the Trinity, particularly what he says about Thomas' teaching on it.
Here is the last paragraph of his account:
"The second possibility [for how to explain the Trinity; the first is Sabellianism] has been adopted by Roman Catholic theology, whose doctrine of the Trinity even to this day speaks of the 'persons' as though the modern concept of personality did not exist, as though the definition of Boethius still continued to be relevant and intelligible, and above all as though the meaning of the definition had been so elucidated in the Middle Ages that it is possible with its help to speak profitably of the trinitarian three."
This reminded me of Pope Benedict's article on the definition of person in theology. Certainly, he was familiar with Barth (though I don't think he mentions him). Barth sees Boethius' definition of person as unhelpful and therefore doesn't see St. Thomas as saying the "persons" are really much more than relations. This is probably why Benedict spends time considering how the notion of relation is in the notion of person. Time is running short, but I'm not done thinking about this...I'll have to check out the book...
Something to think about: How do people try to explain the Trinity apart from Thomas' account? Before I knew Thomas' account, I knew what one had to say but not how to explain it. With St. Thomas, I have some way to reckon from two procession to three persons, from the Scripture to the defined dogma. Yet many cannot do this. Many will rightly affirm one God who is Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. But how do the learned explain it? Are they ultimately Sabellians or Tritheists? Is the difference just where they draw the line of Mystery? Well, I'll at least read this one account.
Here's the quote from Ratzinger's article:
"Relativity toward the other constitutes the human person. The human person is the event or being of relativity." (Joseph Ratzinger, Concerning the Notion of Person in Theology)
Whoa, that's heavy. Will definitely consider that more later.
It's clear that the professor doesn't completely agree St. Thomas on every point in his consideration on the Trinity. My difficulty: Where else does one go to find an alternate account? I read a little of St. Gregory Nazianzus (Oratio 31), and in it I saw the doctrine of St. Thomas. I suspect that if I read St. Augustine or Hilary or Basil, I would see accounts that remind me very much of what St. Thomas says. A rejection of his account would seem in some ways to be a rejection of the Fathers, since his thought is really a synthesis of their thought. Walking through the shelves of the library, I saw for the first time Karl Barth's Church Dogmatics. I've read about Karl Barth (a Reformed theologian of sorts) but never seen this huge work. I picked it up to look at what he has to say about the Trinity, particularly what he says about Thomas' teaching on it.
Here is the last paragraph of his account:
"The second possibility [for how to explain the Trinity; the first is Sabellianism] has been adopted by Roman Catholic theology, whose doctrine of the Trinity even to this day speaks of the 'persons' as though the modern concept of personality did not exist, as though the definition of Boethius still continued to be relevant and intelligible, and above all as though the meaning of the definition had been so elucidated in the Middle Ages that it is possible with its help to speak profitably of the trinitarian three."
This reminded me of Pope Benedict's article on the definition of person in theology. Certainly, he was familiar with Barth (though I don't think he mentions him). Barth sees Boethius' definition of person as unhelpful and therefore doesn't see St. Thomas as saying the "persons" are really much more than relations. This is probably why Benedict spends time considering how the notion of relation is in the notion of person. Time is running short, but I'm not done thinking about this...I'll have to check out the book...
Something to think about: How do people try to explain the Trinity apart from Thomas' account? Before I knew Thomas' account, I knew what one had to say but not how to explain it. With St. Thomas, I have some way to reckon from two procession to three persons, from the Scripture to the defined dogma. Yet many cannot do this. Many will rightly affirm one God who is Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. But how do the learned explain it? Are they ultimately Sabellians or Tritheists? Is the difference just where they draw the line of Mystery? Well, I'll at least read this one account.
Here's the quote from Ratzinger's article:
"Relativity toward the other constitutes the human person. The human person is the event or being of relativity." (Joseph Ratzinger, Concerning the Notion of Person in Theology)
Whoa, that's heavy. Will definitely consider that more later.
Friday, September 6, 2013
Procession of Love
I'm now reading the Summa Theologiae on the Trinity again for a class.
I was reading about how there is a procession of love distinct from the procession of the intellect. Then I thought about the way St. Augustine approaches the notion of the interior word. He starts with the most obvious sense of word, the spoken word. From there he moves to the imagined word and then to the concept which comes forth when one thinks, and then says this is the closest we come to understanding God's word.
When we talk about the procession of love, I think it is from an analogy with the procession of the intellect, but we start with the interior/intellectual word as that from which we move to the will. Is there a visible/exterior procession of love that corresponds to the spoken word? It seems that it would be either an exterior action, or perhaps even a loving word. These more obviously have the account of impelling or moving, since by exterior actions you cause other things to move. I want to use the word fruit here for these exterior acts that proceed from love. And just as a word can proceed from truth or falsehood in one's mind, so fruits can proceed from the love of either the good or the bad. You will know them by their fruits.
After making that connection, I started reading the article on whether this procession is generation. Now fruits (in the case of trees) certainly seem to be generated (or at least brought forth..) by the tree. That makes me wonder if it is a good idea to call these fruits... I wonder if, just as St. Thomas was able to state what is essential to generation, it would be possible to consider what is essential in the account of fruit and find out how it fits in the whole picture.
(Unfortunately I'm in a hurry, or I would look at the I-II quaestio on fruits of the Holy Spirit...)
Another note, this consideration is moving from considering the interior procession of love to the exterior procession of love. Yet this exterior procession is more known, and by considering the relation between the two processions, hopefully this will help us to be reminded of God's interior life in every procession of love that we see.
Short update (9/13/13): I was reading a little from the section of the Summa on whether "Gift" is a proper name of the Holy Spirit (it is), and perhaps I ought to look at that more. I'm not sure why I like the word fruit so much...the confusion with birth could happen. Then again, Gift as well as Fruit both imply origin (which is important), and there is relationship between the ideas of one-born and gift that I haven't thought much about...hm..
I was reading about how there is a procession of love distinct from the procession of the intellect. Then I thought about the way St. Augustine approaches the notion of the interior word. He starts with the most obvious sense of word, the spoken word. From there he moves to the imagined word and then to the concept which comes forth when one thinks, and then says this is the closest we come to understanding God's word.
When we talk about the procession of love, I think it is from an analogy with the procession of the intellect, but we start with the interior/intellectual word as that from which we move to the will. Is there a visible/exterior procession of love that corresponds to the spoken word? It seems that it would be either an exterior action, or perhaps even a loving word. These more obviously have the account of impelling or moving, since by exterior actions you cause other things to move. I want to use the word fruit here for these exterior acts that proceed from love. And just as a word can proceed from truth or falsehood in one's mind, so fruits can proceed from the love of either the good or the bad. You will know them by their fruits.
After making that connection, I started reading the article on whether this procession is generation. Now fruits (in the case of trees) certainly seem to be generated (or at least brought forth..) by the tree. That makes me wonder if it is a good idea to call these fruits... I wonder if, just as St. Thomas was able to state what is essential to generation, it would be possible to consider what is essential in the account of fruit and find out how it fits in the whole picture.
(Unfortunately I'm in a hurry, or I would look at the I-II quaestio on fruits of the Holy Spirit...)
Another note, this consideration is moving from considering the interior procession of love to the exterior procession of love. Yet this exterior procession is more known, and by considering the relation between the two processions, hopefully this will help us to be reminded of God's interior life in every procession of love that we see.
Short update (9/13/13): I was reading a little from the section of the Summa on whether "Gift" is a proper name of the Holy Spirit (it is), and perhaps I ought to look at that more. I'm not sure why I like the word fruit so much...the confusion with birth could happen. Then again, Gift as well as Fruit both imply origin (which is important), and there is relationship between the ideas of one-born and gift that I haven't thought much about...hm..
Thursday, September 5, 2013
Hierarchy of truths, God and creatures
Right now I'm reading Theology Today: Perspectives, Principles, and Criteria for a fundamental theology class. (read it here: http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/cti_documents/rc_cti_doc_20111129_teologia-oggi_en.html ) That will involve writing a paper, so I will probably write more thoughts on it. There was a citation in the section on faith's relationship with reason, and I was glad to see that it adapts very much of what St. Thomas teaches on philosophy. What especially stood out is the way our mind stands to reality, not as something that imposes order on it, but rather as something that is open to reality and approaches it by different methods. I'll think more about that later...
Later on the document talked about an order among truths, citing St. Thomas. In haste, I will just cite II-II, q. 1, a. 7. Go read Thomas. The point that stood out is that all the articles of faith are contained in two: "God exists" and "God is provident". These two truths sum up or contain everything about God's interior life and exterior life. They contain the mystery of the most holy Trinity and the mystery of the Incarnation. What is interesting is that both of these truths fall under those that can be attained by human reason. So at some point I will want to work out the details of how they can be at once truths knowable by unaided reason and yet contain all the other articles of faith virtually, in such a way that God a man who held just those to propositions by faith (rather than reason?) might even be justified on account of that faith. Is it faith that makes the holding of those proposition salutary? Is that because faith is necessarily open to further instruction from another, whereas reason may see itself at a conclusion? Not sure, more thinking will follow.
Also related to this, is the mystery of creation and everything that isn't God. It is interesting that St. Thomas names two propositions rather than one. Earlier in the Summa, it is shown that God is provident, and it seems (I'm pretty sure it is) the case that God's providence is the same with his essence. Yet, why would he single this attribute out? It seems that it is because it has to do with what is not necessary. It is necessary that God exist. It is not necessary that he create, and consequently be provident over such a creation. This reminds me of an argument I had a year ago about whether God's providence is really knowable by human reason. I held that it was...and I still think it is, but I also have a hunch that it's account makes it different from other predicates that pertain to God. The fact that reason must start with creatures in ascending to knowledge of God, means that natural knowledge of God will some how involve his relation to creatures.
Just to draw out what I mean by the mystery of creation (this is all out of order, but apparently so is my mind): God is free in creating the world. He doesn't have to. And yet God does do it. And God's being and activity are not other than each other in re, at least with respect to his interior life (I wish I could state more definitively about all his activity, but this is where my understanding breaks down). If God is the same with his activity, does that mean he is the same with his act of creation? But if his essence is to create the finite world, then isn't it necessary that he do so? If it is necessary, is it contrary to his freedom? If it is not necessary, then is that act really the same with his essence?
Later on the document talked about an order among truths, citing St. Thomas. In haste, I will just cite II-II, q. 1, a. 7. Go read Thomas. The point that stood out is that all the articles of faith are contained in two: "God exists" and "God is provident". These two truths sum up or contain everything about God's interior life and exterior life. They contain the mystery of the most holy Trinity and the mystery of the Incarnation. What is interesting is that both of these truths fall under those that can be attained by human reason. So at some point I will want to work out the details of how they can be at once truths knowable by unaided reason and yet contain all the other articles of faith virtually, in such a way that God a man who held just those to propositions by faith (rather than reason?) might even be justified on account of that faith. Is it faith that makes the holding of those proposition salutary? Is that because faith is necessarily open to further instruction from another, whereas reason may see itself at a conclusion? Not sure, more thinking will follow.
Also related to this, is the mystery of creation and everything that isn't God. It is interesting that St. Thomas names two propositions rather than one. Earlier in the Summa, it is shown that God is provident, and it seems (I'm pretty sure it is) the case that God's providence is the same with his essence. Yet, why would he single this attribute out? It seems that it is because it has to do with what is not necessary. It is necessary that God exist. It is not necessary that he create, and consequently be provident over such a creation. This reminds me of an argument I had a year ago about whether God's providence is really knowable by human reason. I held that it was...and I still think it is, but I also have a hunch that it's account makes it different from other predicates that pertain to God. The fact that reason must start with creatures in ascending to knowledge of God, means that natural knowledge of God will some how involve his relation to creatures.
Just to draw out what I mean by the mystery of creation (this is all out of order, but apparently so is my mind): God is free in creating the world. He doesn't have to. And yet God does do it. And God's being and activity are not other than each other in re, at least with respect to his interior life (I wish I could state more definitively about all his activity, but this is where my understanding breaks down). If God is the same with his activity, does that mean he is the same with his act of creation? But if his essence is to create the finite world, then isn't it necessary that he do so? If it is necessary, is it contrary to his freedom? If it is not necessary, then is that act really the same with his essence?
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