Basically a brainstorm

Basically a brainstorm

I haven't quite worked out the argument for the most important chunks of the thesis: explaining the relationship among the causes. As I'm beginning my study of metaphysics, I'm finding that this is precisely one of the great challenges of the metaphysician, so I'm somewhat worried about how to proceed, but I'll just try to avoid saying false things and not forget important points.

The order of causes will come up in two places: explaining God's creation and how it is distinct from natural/artistic changes; and then how God is himself a likeness of prime matter sufficient for knowing it. God and prime matter are alike insofar as they are first causes. But cause is said in many ways (this why the treatment of analogous names was given above). The word cause is not said wholly equivocally of efficient, material, formal, and final cause, rather they are said analogously: they are reducible or referable back to some first meaning. Although we first say cause about material (or efficient?) causality, it is final cause which is truly first among causes. It is the cause of causes. (Explain why final cause is first in artistic and natural happenings; then move on toward creation.)

I keep hesitating to get very specific, but I'll do it this weekend. In that place, I will only explain creation and why material causality is caused by God. Later in explaining how God knows it, I will look at that analogy. Then there is the section on knowing individuals. This can have a more detailed account of our cognition of them, which then extends to God's. This is only a that argument, the how will come later and be discussed according to the analogies among causes and also by looking at matter's disposition to form. Will that be enough? Maybe. I'll have to talk about the sort of likeness knowing requires. That could be tough, but not too much. I hope I'm not too vague in my approach to things, though I anticipate that criticism. All right, this weekend for sure. Being done will be great. I can probably look up Cajetan or Scotus on these matters and be ready for a more thorough elucidation at the defense. Pretty exciting!


Sent from my iPhone

Singular difficulty

Having shown above how the senses and the intellect differ in their objects of knowledge, a difficulty arises concerning God's knowledge. The intellect receives its object by abstracting it from the material conditions of the senses, thereby making it universal. Among these material conditions are the particular wheres and whens that accompany the object of sense, without which it is impossible for men to know things in their singularity. Aristotle even says, "reason [or intellect] has to do with universals, sense with singular things." So then it would seem to follow that God, who is his own intellect and does not know by means of a sensitive organ, is wholly ignorant of these singular realities and only knows them as they fall under some universal concept. Since God excels his effects in every way, it is not possible that man should know something that God does not. In order to answer this difficulty, St. Thomas argues that God contains within himself "an immaterial likeness of prime matter" by which he is able to know singulars. In order to resolve more satisfactorily the difficulty of whether God knows singulars, it is worth inquiring further into whether and how God knows prime matter and, finally, why this solves the difficulty involved in God knowing singulars.

[Next write about God's power over prime matter. Then inquire further into the likeness. A lot further. Then return to the relation between prime matter and singulars.]

God's knowledge in general

There are several ways to go about proving that God has knowledge. (Place a footnote here about the other ways of proving this; perhaps explain why you are using this one) The argument St. Thomas gives in the Summa Theologiae is from God's immateriality. He starts by stating a difference between intelligent and non-intelligent beings, one that was stated earlier in this essay. "We must note that intelligent beings are distinguished from non-intelligent beings in that the latter possess only their own form; whereas the intelligent being is naturally adapted to have also the form of some other thing." This is similar to what was stated earlier about sensation when it was said that a sense organ receives a sensible form in a way other than the way matter receives forms. The eye remains what it is while it receives the form of and sees what is other than it. This is only possible by some kind of immaterial having, since matter is only capable of possessing one form at a time. As matter is limited to only possessing one form, the more removed from matter something is, the greater is its ability to have many forms. For example, it was above stated that the intellect is able to abstract from what is received from the senses and hold universal truth. This abstraction is from the material conditions of the here and the now, and this is possible because the intellect is itself not constricted by a bodily organ. Since God is in no way confined by matter, he is most free of all, and therefore most a knower.

[Question: why aren't angels all knowing if they are wholly immaterial? I probably don't need to address that here, but I should have some idea, just in case.]

After establishing that God is a knower, an argument must be given for what he knows. Knowing occurs whenever a knower is united with what is to be known. For example, the senses must be joined (through a medium) to some sensible object in order to actually sense, and intellect actually knows when it is joined to an intelligible form. God is himself both intellect and intelligible at once, always one and therefore always knowing and known. (This is begging to be expanded, but move on.)  God is the chief object of his own knowledge, and through this knowledge he knows all that he knows. Since God is the same with his power, and by this power he is capable of bringing forth all that exists and can exist, so he also knows all of those things which can be effects of his power.

[Next post: God's power. Is prime matter in it?]

Brief account of human knowledge of prime matter

[This seems like a rather bold task, but some consideration of we come to know is essential if we're going to make sense of the difficulties involved in knowing matter and if we are to give an account of how God knows at all. I think I have the truths about these things in my mind, but I'm not at all comfortable determining the order of approach. Nor is it clear to what extent these things should be considered.]

All human knowledge begins with the senses. Sensation occurs when a sense organ is acted upon by a sensible object in such a way that the sensible form is received in a way other than the way matter receives forms. For example, a rock can be heated but cannot feel heat; on the other hand, if a man stands near a fire, he will not only become heated, but he will feel the heat. This cognition or awareness of heat is peculiar to sensation, and requires a possibility to receive which goes beyond the capacity of non-living bodies. Furthermore, our senses can be brought into act only by some sensible object acting on it, which requires that it actually have some sensible quality. Since prime matter is pure potency, as was said above, (and potency is opposed to actuality) prime matter will be incapable of acting upon our senses in virtue of itself.

Beyond the senses, man also has a mind or intellect. By this power he is able to abstract from what his senses receive and know things in a universal way. For example, man not only sees this red and that red, but has abstracted from this sense experience a universal concept of red, through which he is able think about and make statements about red, without attending to some particular instance of it (e.g. red is my favorite color, apples are red, and so on). It is not by our intellect abstracting that we have a concept of prime matter. Since abstraction only happens by making universal what is perceived by the senses, and prime matter is not an object of sensation, prime matter is not abstracted from our senses. Our concept of it comes from an argument (like the one given above) and depends on other concepts which we have abstracted from our senses. So when it is said that prime matter is pure potency to substance, we understand this through an analogy of how a substance stands to its accidents, substance and accident being two concepts which we have abstracted from sensation. (a footnote or perhaps some more body where I mention the truth that "everything is intelligible insofar as it is act")

Although we are able to form some analogous concept of prime matter, we only understand it by likening it to something else which is actual. Prime matter in itself still seems to remain unknown and even unknowable. Now it remains a question as to whether God knows prime matter in itself. Before this, we must first consider God's knowledge more generally.

[There are a few ways I could go from here, most of which deviate from the outline in part... Instead of just talking about human cognition in general, as I intended, I went ahead and talked about how prime matter relates to our knowledge. This seemed important for manifesting the difficulty. I could just say "something is intelligible insofar as it is actual", but I wanted to make more clear the meaning of that statement by situating it within the context of human knowledge. At the end, I made it sound like I'm just going to talk about God's knowledge generally... I'll probably do that. I want to talk at some point about how we know singulars, and that account doesn't work for God. That should be coming up soon. Perhaps after the general consideration.]

Account of prime matter

Since prime matter is itself a concept which is not known to all, it is useful to begin with a consideration of what it is and why there are difficulties involved in knowing it. (footnote about Physics 1 and how it lays out the discovery of prime matter) The concept of prime matter first arises when one is analyzing the principles of change. Whenever some change occurs, something must remains and something must pass away. For example, when a sick man becomes healthy, the illness ceases to be and the health begins to be, but the man exists both before and after the change. So also in any change there will something which persists through the change. If it were not the case that something persisted, then one could never say that any thing changed, but just that things sometimes exist and sometimes do not exist. Granting the existence of change, something must underlie it. To come to prime matter, one must see that this is true of both substantial change and accidental change. Accidental changes refer to the coming to be or passing away of accidents: for example, a change in size, place, or some quality. In such cases, it is always a substance which underlies the changes. Yet when a change occurs from one kind of substance to another, then something beside substance must underlie this change. This is what Aristotle calls the underlying nature, and what St. Thomas calls materia prima or first matter. (footnote about how I will use the phrase "prime matter" since that is the typical English rendition, although it seems first matter is better translation)

After resolving to the existence of such a principle, there are further things that can be said about it. Just as a substance is not in a certain place on account of being that substance, but is potentially in any place; so also it is true that prime matter, not being itself a substance, is potentially any substance. From this, prime matter is said to be pure potency with regard to every substantial form.

[It looks like I might have to do some restructuring of the outline. I next wanted to talk about how prime matter is not a principle of our knowledge. I was thinking that follows easily enough from it being pure potency, but without at least a brief account of how we abstract, it's going to be difficult to express the problem.]

[There's also the bit in the outline about how prime matter is a principle of individuation. It seems that I could talk about that here or later. That is a rather difficult topic all on its own... I do want to talk about how we know singulars though, and why God's knowledge of them has to be different from that. Especially look at the fact that we know singulars through our senses and how God does not have senses. Yes, this will do for now.]

[One more comment, the stuff written on theology can probably go even before this section. Also, there's no reason to bring up Berkeley: the existence of prime matter is sufficiently established. But it will be helpful to bring up Timaeus' position later on.]

The Method and Limits of Theology

In this and following posts, I hope to write sections that will be incorporated into my thesis. Although I am writing with a view to the main thesis topic, each of the preliminary are independent enough that they can be considered individually:

Theology simply means divine science, or the science about God and divine things. Often this word is used exclusively to mean the study of sacred scripture and the truths revealed by God through the prophets, but this is not the only way to approach a study of God. At the conclusion of the Physics, Aristotle proves that there must be some intelligent being without a body. Since it belongs to natural science to consider bodies, it must belong to some other science to consider what does not have a body. This proof of God's existence from material things is the beginning of a philosophical theology which does not depend on faith in the words of a prophet.

Since God is not present to our senses and is unlike anything in common experience, knowledge about him is reached through argument and most often through a denial of attributes which are seen in creatures. For example, St. Thomas Aquinas's articles on divine simplicity proceed by showing that various modes of composition which are present in creatures do not exist in God. Another way of proceeding in theology is by discussing how the perfections of creatures are found in God. Since the arguments for God's existence are from his effects, the perfections of these effects must exist within God in a higher way, without the imperfections that accompany them in creatures. For example, wisdom is a habit in men which can be attained or lost, whereas in God it is the same with his essence.

Because of how distant God is from creatures, it is necessary to consider the names we use about God and how they are able to signify something true about him. Aristotle begins his Categories by making a distinction between univocal and equivocal names. Names are said univocally of two things when both the sound and the account are the same for the things spoken about. Names are said equivocally of two things when the same sound is said of two things, but the account differ. No name will be said univocally of God and creatures, for everything in creatures is caused, whereas nothing is caused in God. On the other hand, if names are said wholly equivocally of God and creatures, it will be impossible to speak about God, for all the names we use have their meaning from creatures. The names said about both God and creatures are called analogous, which is a certain kind of equivocal name. Some names are equivocal on account of chance, such as bat, which is said of both the winged mammal and the instrument of a baseball player (footnote confirming that those are etymologically unrelated words); such names are of no use in considering God. On the other hand, some names are said equivocally of several things because of they have a relationship of cause and effect. For example, healthy is said of both man and food, where man is primarily called healthy and food is called healthy because it makes a man to be healthy. Such names are analogous, and these will be useful for talking about God, since all creatures are his effects.

[Next segue into talking about God's knowledge, and how this will require a preliminary consideration of knowledge more generally and how it relates to immateriality. From what I've written so far, it is not clear how this consideration is necessary for the overall paper, but that can be fixed.]

Revised outline

After attempting to write another draft (based on the previous outline), it has become more and more clear, that my outline does not give sufficient space and ordering to the topics which I will need to consider in a preliminary way before I will be able to give my actual argument in a way that makes sense.

Newly revised thesis outline:

• An introduction (currently I just jump right in)
• Briefly lead up to and state the thesis and topic under consideration
• Explain the relevance/worthiness of the topic considered
• The knowledge which is most truly knowledge is a knowledge of principles and causes. God and prime matter are each first causes in a certain respect, and therefore are each worth considering on account of that.
• Knowledge is the primary means by which beings communicate. In showing how God knows prime matter, it will be seen how the highest of beings communicates with the lowest of beings. Also, through considering the extremes, light is shed on what falls between.
• Knowledge of singulars is a particularly interesting aspect of knowledge, and God's knowledge of matter is related to how he knows material individuals in their individuality.
• To prepare the reader, an outline (quite like this one) will be given to guide the reader through the considerations and arguments that will follow
• The what and esse of prime matter
• This will be for the most part a paraphrase of the Physics 1.
• Focus will then be made on how prime matter barely exists and the problems it presents for knowing in general.
• Perhaps here or later, it will be discussed that prime matter is a principle of individuation in material things, and therefore that it will have to do with knowing them
• Consideration of the method and limits of (natural) theology, the science of God
• (Perhaps this topic alone would suffice as thesis topic, but I'll just go at it to the extent that it will be helpful for my thesis. This seems necessary, for it one might be tempted to think that this is a purely academic exercise or worse, if it is not made clear just what is being done when one tries to understand something about God.)
• Preliminary distinction between sacred theology and the divine science proper to philosophy, and that this is the latter.
• We must go from the more known to the less known, go from creatures to God
• Talk about analogous names here, how every name we say about God will first be said of creatures but will be more truly said of God because there is nothing of imperfection in him
• Knowledge in general
• Since we see perfections in creatures first, it is necessary to consider knowledge as it exists in creatures and in the highest of creatures
• Focus on the immaterial aspect of knowing, this is obscure but develop it
• Knowledge in God generally
• Since all perfections exist in God in a higher way, God is indeed a knower
• (Look at the argument in Contra Gentes, as they may be more proportioned to the consideration of a philosopher)
• Explain why he primarily knows himself, and how he secondarily knows all creatures
• Talk further about how he knows creatures in their distinctions from each other
• God's knowledge of prime matter
• Before discussing this more particular question, look at how man knows singulars and why this account does not fit to God (or angels), and how St. Thomas resolves it to an immaterial likeness of matter. This resolution is the reason for considering this kind of knowledge in particular.
• His knowledge of prime matter involves special difficulties on account of what prime matter is.
• Look at and address with some precision how it falls within God's power. (I keep mention Berkeley and Timaeus in the same breath, but really their objections to the doctrine of St. Thomas are so different in kind as to belong different parts of the paper. Here is where Timaeus is worth considering).
• In what way is prime matter in God's power, and in what way is it not.
• After it is clear that God must in some way know prime matter, talk about the handful of approaches to better understanding how he knows prime matter:
• He knows it as it is, that is, as a principle of substance and therefore not apart from it. Although prime matter is not a perfection nor does it have perfection itself, it in potency to every material perfection and so God can know it as perfectible.
• God can have a (quasi?) speculative knowledge of prime matter. This is where I will discuss in what way God is like prime matter and is a sufficient likeness for knowing it.
• God can know it through privation (just as he knows evil through privation). This may not be as exciting or interesting, but I may address it if I give the fourfold division of God's knowledge from De Veritate 3.3, just for the sake of completeness.
• If I spend enough time on the parts of the thesis above, I will probably be pretty much done with my thesis. If it is short, I can explain more. It will be helpful. Try to use examples when possible.

All right, so that is all I need to do. This division is much better than the last one I made, and it should not be difficult to write decent-sized chunks and then string them all together. The section where I give an outline, I will probably not be as thorough about subdivisions, but I will give the reasons for why I go in the order that I do.

Thesis intro draft/outline

• God knows himself perfectly
• Therefore God knows his power perfectly
• Therefore he knows all of the effects of his power
• First matter is one of the effects of his power
• In a sense, yes
• In a sense, no
• Therefore God knows first matter

The argument above is basically the argument that God knows anything other than himself. Since he is the only immediate object of his knowledge, his knowledge of all other things is through his self-knowledge. The only difficult premise is the way in which God is the cause of first matter.

Another argument that God knows first matter is through explaining how God knows singulars.

• All perfections of creatures exist in God in a higher way.
• It is a perfection in creatures to know singulars.
• Therefore God knows singulars.
• Now material creatures know the universal by the intellect and the particular by the sense
• When the intellect abstracts, it receives the form without the matter, without the here and now, and therefore cannot perceive the particular
• The sense, on the other hand, does receive with the here and now, with material conditions, because the sense power belongs to a material organ
• Now God does not have material organs on account of which he could perceive with material conditions, so he must know singulars by his intellect
• Unlike our intellect, God does not abstract in his knowing, rather everything he knows must exist within him in a higher way
• So God contains within himself an immaterial likeness of matter by which he knows singulars.

That argument is a little longer and requires one to consider more carefully how our cognition compares to God's. By presenting both of these arguments, one sees better the more interesting truths related to God's knowledge of first matter:

• God is the cause of material things, even with regard to their materiality
• God knows singulars, even in their singularity

The first argument really only has one difficult premise (so long as the rest about God's knowledge is granted), but the latter one has more involved difficulties. To what extent is a consideration of human cognition helpful? One really only needs to see that cognition of singulars is a perfection, and yet we do not have that perfection in the most perfect way. God does. So then there is the last sentence which demands explication: What is "an immaterial likeness of matter"? So I will explain in what way God has an immaterial likeness of matter, rather in what way God is an immaterial likeness of matter. And also how this likeness suffices for God to know singulars in all their singularity.

The Good in Nature

There is an almost complete absence of natural philosophy in the typical philosophy curriculum. That is a mistake. Since the starting point for a common pursuit (wisdom) must be something common, it makes sense that nature be this common thing. This is especially the case in American society, where pluralism and diversity of cultural backgrounds make it impossible to find common ground in a common heritage. So human nature is what we have common. But because it is often difficult to distinguish in men between what is according to nature and what is according to custom, it may be wise to step back and consider nature more generally. If there are principles that must be true about every motion and every mobile thing, then they must also be true about men, at least insofar as they are mobile.

I'm just going to copy and paste of chunk of the Summa Theologiae (I-II.1.2) and rearrange it.

Every agent, of necessity, acts for an end.
For if, in a number of causes ordained to one another, the first be removed, the others must, of necessity, be removed also. 
Now the first of all causes is the final cause.
The reason of which is that matter does not receive form, save in so far as it is moved by an agent; for nothing reduces itself from potentiality to act.
But an agent does not move except out of intention for an end.
For if the agent were not determinate to some particular effect, it would not do one thing rather than another: consequently in order that it produce a determinate effect, it must, of necessity, be determined to some certain one, which has the nature of an end.
And just as this determination is effected, in the rational nature, by the "rational appetite," which is called the will; so, in other things, it is caused by their natural inclination, which is called the "natural appetite."


[Given that the italicized statement is true, the bold statements are true as well. Since 'end' has the notion of 'good', a natural end is equivalent to a natural good. So if man has a nature, he has a natural end and a natural good.]

The way St. Thomas proceeds in the following question is interesting: he follows a negative path to reach what constitutes man's happiness, namely God. This is interesting because negation of created things is proper to the consideration of God. Does this constitute a distinct argument for God's existence? If one denied the existence of God would it have to follow that men are necessarily unhappy? Or just not as happy as possible?

Book idea

Book idea

Sounds crazy, but would be fun. All right so, we're at TAC ultimately to study St. Thomas and holy Scripture, to learn from God himself. This makes it sometimes difficult to give a fair treatment of certain authors that appear later, such as Spinoza, Hegel, Marx. Often the conflict with reality is manifest, some of these authors are difficult. So, in order to study them more carefully, it would be fun to write the story of a student captivated by the arguments, unable to find faults in the words of Hegel and Marx, taking them as the culmination of the world-historical motion toward self-consciousness.

Of course our central character would have to see himself as the culmination or next step, and he would also have to be active in bringing forth history.

Sometimes these thinkers seem to put forth what amounts to a justification of evil, self love, and so on. The problem is that many already live according to principles laid down in these authors. One need not be a philosopher to act against nature. Hm, I'll have to think about this more but not be absorbed by it. I should to spend my free hours in a more direct pursuit of wisdom. Of course a student who is capable of understanding Marx and Hegel must have some keenness of wit, and therefore cannot abandon the truth found in Aristotle or St. Thomas. Unfortunately he would have to be either an apostate or one who never believed if he is able to embrace what such thinkers teach.

I was talking to someone yesterday who called Epictetus the anti-Christian, and this surprised me. Yet he said it because Ep teaches one to find truth in one's own will rather than in something outside. I tried to defend him by saying that spiritual goods are indeed better than material goods, but he seemed that there is denial of the external good. That will also mean a rejection of a common good. Does any one see how isolated is the world of Descartes or Hume? Despite his errors, Marx must seem like a breath of fresh air. Yet he is a materialist and therefore cannot embrace or teach a true common good.

Where could our character go after seeing the troubles in denying God or immateriality? Perhaps he doesn't see them. But then isn't he merely a slave? Either to his passions or to material necessity. Isn't he alone?

He couldn't be alone. We live in an intellectual community. Would he be capable of dialogue? He would be a beastly man if he reduced all intellectual habits to mere material processes. Yet could he really hold anything else? Even about himself?

I'm torn now between whether or not he could retain anything of ancient wisdom. Is it not explained away by the later thinkers? But if that is so, then it seems his understanding will only be of a shallow sort.

Some how he will have to meet people. They will have to be real persons. By real, I mean that they show forth the truths which are perennial. Yet perhaps our friend cannot see it. Perhaps he will even reduce it in his mind. This shouldn't be a difficult part to play: it is an evil man. To enter such a mentality does not sound appealing though, perhaps it would even be a danger to my own habits of mind. I don't want to preach a message in this book, I just want to see this character. If he appears absurd, I want that only to be because he is. But it must be seen, not said.

Who can live like that? Anyone. We are all sinners. Oh, but to see what is the true way of life and then to see this, is it anything less than pitiable in the highest degree?


Sent from my iPhone

Thesis Post, 11/11

I'm just doing another freewrite to get thoughts flowing on my thesis. First, an outline of sorts.

Thesis: God knows first matter.

• Explain the relevance of the question
•  Better understand knowledge, God, and matter
• This premise is part of the argument for God's providence over particulars
• Explain the problem, which is:
• Matter seems in itself unintelligible, wholly removed from being known
• Yet God is supposed to know all things
• Certain philosophers think he did not know first matter
• Thus some deny first matter's existence
• Others deny God's providence over particulars
• Give the argument for God's knowledge of first matter, starting with his simplicity

All right, that last bullet point could be shown in the form of premises/syllogisms. If my understanding of those arguments are as a scientific as they ought to be, then there should be no problem in presenting them and writing an essay around them. I follow the progress of St. Thomas in Summa, I, question 14.


Knowledge begins where immateriality begins.

God is immaterial.

Therefore, God is a knower.

Knowledge occurs when the knower and the known are united.

Immaterial beings are one with themselves.

Therefore, God knows himself. 

(And comprehensively/perfectly. Look up the argument to see if it is anything beyond noting God's perfection.)

God knows himself perfectly.

God is the same as his power.

Therefore, he knows his power perfectly.

God knows his power perfectly.

His power extends to all possible creatures.

Therefore, God knows all possible creatures.

So after four or five syllogisms, I've proved (with some hesitation) that God knows all creatures through his self-knowledge. What needs proving is still that first matter is a creature. Not too difficult, though it has some problems because it is not quite a being either.

First matter is potency to form, and therefore not actual of itself.

Something exists insofar as it is in act.

Therefore, matter cannot exist from on its own.

And therefore, only exists with/in/as/under/on-account-of a substance.

But God is the cause of substances.

Therefore, God is the cause of first matter.

And therefore, first matter falls under God's power.

And therefore, God knows first matter.

All right. Those argument could be fleshed out or clarified or perhaps even slimmed down (that last chunk is not concise). Then comes the question of how God knows matter. (This will constitute a separate bullet point.) Although the proof seems sound, it hasn't solved the difficulty that matter seems of itself unknowable. I'll have to look at it again (I suppose I could do it now, but it's fun to see how much of this I can bring forth from the memory), but I believe St. Thomas explains how God knows creatures in their distinction (in kind) by looking at perfection. Because all perfections exist in him in a higher way, he is able to know them as they exist in creatures has differentiating essences. Then in the article on how God knows individuals, St. Thomas says that God must have within him a likeness, not only of common principles, but also of individual principles (i.e. matter).

Now this is difficult to explain because, whereas the common principles (natures) involve varying degrees of perfection, matter is by definition imperfect, almost imperfection itself. So in what way could God know it? Certainly he does, for it falls within his power. One way matter is like God, is that it is a principle, and therefore has some participation in God's principality (in an extended sense..).

It seems better to look more closely at the articles concerning God's knowledge of evil and non-being. He knows evil only through the privation of good. He knows non-being only insofar as it is possible being. Thus, this allows two more possibilities for how he knows matter. Since matter is not a being in the proper sense, but a principle of a being, it makes sense that God have a knowledge of it through that of which it is a principle (namely, substance). There are reasons why one would want disagree with that, but it still seems plausible to me.

On the other hand, matter is potential being. Since God knows non-beings only insofar as they are possible, perhaps his knowledge of matter is related to this.

[Question: (Oh no, brackets!) Is it the same thing to know first matter and to know the possibility of a substance to become another substance? Is matter anything other than that possibility? It seems so. More like a principle of that possibility. Yet also a principle of the substance. Hm...] 

Lost my train of thought...

Now it seems like, the above is actually fairly concise, so I want to spend the most time laying and understanding various possibilities for how God knows first matter. It seems very possible that I will not be able to give a definitive account of that. But to look at all the plausible possibilities, follow them out, and perhaps decide on a most probable account seems doable. Perhaps a list of what to look at more closely would be helpful.

• St. Thomas on whether God has an idea of matter
• On God's knowledge of non-being, since matter is in some way non-being
• On God's knowledge of evil which is through good, since matter is possibly known through privation
• A look at how we know first matter, to see if anything of this account is fitting to God's knowledge

This should be the fun part of the thesis. Have fun! Read the Summa. Read De Veritate. Read De ente et essentia? Read whatever will give some plausible account of God's knowledge of matter.

Vatican II against individualism

Vatican II against individualism

Reading the documents of the Second Vatican Council, it seems that a primary concern was that men know salvation is only found within the context of a community. The 4 major constitutions relate to this in some way. Dei Verbum teaches that Scropture must be read within the context of the Church. Sacrosanctum Concilium teaches that worship must arise from tradition and include the participation of all. Lumen Gentium most clearly states the need of a Church, saying that God did not will to call men one by one, but rather he willed to bring them into a people for himself. The document goes on to explain the unity of this body and ends with the first among her members, the holy Mother of God. Gaudium et Spes is the document I am least familiar with, but t seems to situate the Church within the community of the world at large. None of us come into this world entirely alone, so also none of us enter the next alone.

Perhaps it is a perennial heresy, that men seek God apart from the community established by him. Then again, St. Augustine calls Pelagius' heresy a new one and perhaps the form of individualism in our day is of a new sort. Protestantism seems to have planted the seeds for this. Protestants removed the mediation established by God and sought a 'direct line' with him. No priests, no sacraments, and ultimately no Church. Of course most Protestants will claim to take church in a different sense of the word, it remains empty for many. "It's between me and God," they say. In doing this, the Church really becomes a kind of ornament or arrangement for those being saved, rather than the chief instrument and sign of salvation. Indeed, it is only insofar as men are part of the Church that they have hope of salvation.

Lumen Gentium spends much of chapter one talking about the Church as the body of Christ. Christ only has one body, and if we are not part of this, we do not die and rise with him. How essential it is that we be there! Bad philosophy may be involved. There is a renegade form of personalism lurking somewhere, and this needs to be exposed. It is the personalism of someone like Ratzinger that leads to seeing need for a place within a community. There is also the problem of secondary causes. How can the Church be essential to salvation if God is the one who decides? For God has willed that it be so.

I read 2 Thessalonians today. It is frightening to read about those who reject the truth. Lord, save me from that number. Gather me with the rest of your saints!


Sent from my iPhone