Wednesday, May 1, 2013

Outline of De ente, Chapters 5 and 6

Chapter 5: Further conclusions

About God
  • [1] Some philosophers say God does not have any essence
    • This is because his essence is not other than his existence
  • [1] God is not in a genus
    • Things in a genus have a common nature, but a diverse existence
    • Since God's nature and existence are the same, he cannot have a common nature and a diverse existence
    • Therefore, God is not in a genus
  • [2] God is existence only, but this does not mean he is the existence of any given thing
    • The existence of God is such that no addition can be made to it
    • The common existence, although it does not include any addition in its account, it also does not exclude it
    • Therefore, the existence of God is not the common existence
  • [3] God has all perfections

About creatures
  • [4] Intellectuals substances are finite and infinite in different ways
    • They are finite insofar as their existence is received and therefore limited by the capacity of their nature, "finite from above"
    • They are infinite insofar as they are not limited or cut off by being received into matter, "infinite from below"
  • [4] Individuation never ceases in the human soul
    • Individuation of the human soul depends on the body for its origin
    • Once the human soul begins to exist at all (that is, once it has "absolute existence"), it acquires its own individuated existence
    • This existence always remains individuated
  • [5] Genus, species, and difference are found in separated substances on account of their essence being other than their existence; yet the proper accidents belonging to them are unknown to us
  • [6-7] How the genus/species in separated substances differ from in composed substances
    • In composed substances
      • Genus is taken from what is material in the essence
      • Difference is taken from what is formal in the essence
    • In separated substances
      • Difference cannot be taken from part of the essence, but must be taken from the whole essence
      • Genus is also taken from the whole essence, but in a different way
      • Genus is taken from what is common among separated substances, namely, from their immateriality and what follows up it, such as intellectuality
      • Difference is taken from what is diverse in them, namely, from the various grades of perfection; not just any perfections, but ones belonging to the species themselves (just as animals have a higher grade of perfection than plants)
  • [8] Essence as found in composed things

Chapter 6: How essence exists in accidents
  • [1] How accidents exist, and how this differs from substance
    • Accidents do not have existence through themselves but only through a subject; this is unlike substances which do not exist in a subject
  • [1] Essence in accidental and substantial forms are alike
    • This is because they both have incomplete definitions
    • Their definitions are incomplete inasmuch as the definition of an accidental form requires the subject in which the accident exists, and the definition of a substantial form requires the matter in which it exists (just as the body is in the definition of the soul)
  • [2] Essence in accidental and substantial forms are unlike
    • The substantial form of itself does not have existence apart from that to which it comes (some matter), yet when it is conjoined to matter, an essence begins to be since the substantial form is part of a complete essence
    • The accidental form comes to a being which is already complete in itself; therefore, the accident does not cause the existence of the subsisting thing to which it comes, but gives it a "second existence" and only causes something which is accidentally one; nor is an accident part of a complete essence
  • [3] All accidents are caused by substances
    • That which is most of all and most truly in any genus is the cause of those that are it in that genus (e.g. fire is the cause of heat in other things)
    • Substance, most of all and most truly having essence, are first in the genus of being, and therefore are the cause of accidents which have being in a secondary way

[The rest of chapter 6 is omitted, since it will probably not be on the final.]

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