Chapter 3: How the
logical intentions (genus, species, difference) belong to essence
- [1] How universal notions (genus, species) are in an essence
- It is impossible that a universal notion belong to the essence as signified through mode of part (“humanity”)
- It is impossible that universal notion belong to essence existing outside the singulars (as the Platonists say)
- For then species/genus would not be said of the individual (e.g. one cannot say Socrates is that which is separated from him)
- Therefore, universal notions belong to the essence as signified through the mode of a whole (such as “man”) since it implicitly contains the individuals
- [2-3] Essence as signified through mode of whole can be considered in two ways
- According to its proper notion (absolute consideration)
- Nothing is true of this except what belongs to it insofar as it is this sort of thing; all else is a false attribution
- e.g. rational belongs to man absolutely considered, white or black do not, one or many do not
- According to the existence it has in this or that one
- This allows accidental predication of it on account of that in which it is
- e.g. man is white (since Socrates is white), though white does not belong to man as man
- Essence in this way has a twofold existence
- Either in singulars or in the soul
- Nature of man absolutely considered does not include existence at all, but it also does not exclude it
- This nature absolutely considered is predicated of individuals
- [4] How the universal notion belongs to the essence (more precisely than in [1])
- Universal notion does not belong to essence absolutely considered
- For then, wherever humanity was found, commonness would be found; but commonness does not exist in individuals
- Universal notion does not belong to essence according to the existence it has in individuals
- For human nature is not found in individuals in its unity
- Therefore, universal notion belongs to essence according to the existence it has in the understanding
- [5] How the intellect abstracts from what is universal
- [6] Although “Socrates is a man” and “Man is a species”, it is not true that “Socrates is a species”
- For species does not belong to man according to the existence it has in Socrates or absolutely considered
- Species belongs to man only as an accident consequent upon its existence in the intellect, but not to man as man
- [7] How predicability is in the notion of a genus
- [8] Summary
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